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Abstract
This paper shows that a firm’s objectives can extend beyond profit maximization.
I use data from a for-profit firm offering charity auctions of celebrities belongings
whose donations affect both revenues and costs. Comparing actual donations with
the profit-maximizing benchmark indicates that the firm donates in excess of profit-
maximization. I provide additional evidence pointing to donations as a further ob-
jective of the firm. Also, donations do not substantially increase willingness to pay,
indicating that demand cannot explain expenditures in CSR. My results shed light on
the functioning of benefit corporations and open questions on the competitive con-
duct of non-profit maximizing companies.
JEL classifications: L21, D64, C14
Keywords: objectives of the firm, corporate social responsibility, donations, structural
estimation, externalities
*I am indebted to Geert Ridder, Giorgio Coricelli and Roger Moon for their invaluable help and sug-
gestions, as well as their continuous support and encouragement. I would also like to thank Ali Abboud,
Susan Athey, Jorge Balat, Vittorio Bassi, Khai X. Chiong, Kenneth Chuk, Jonathan Davis, Daniel Elfenbein,
Cary Frydman, Aryal Gaurab, Giovanni Gardelli, Chad Kendall, Asim Khwaja, Tatiana Komarova, Rocco
Macchiavello, Kristo´f Madara´sz, Francesca Molinari, Jia Nan, Hashem Pesaran, Jean-Marc Robin, Aloysius
Siow, Matthew Shum, Jorge Tamayo and Sha Yang. This paper also benefited greatly from the comments
of the participants to seminars at Carlos III, CalState Long Beach, Caltech, Imperial College, Sciences Po,
and Warwick and at the 2019 ESSO, 2018 EEA-ESEM, the 2016 and 2018 IIOC, the 2017 EMCON, the 2016
IAAE and the 2016 California Econometrics Conference, where previous versions of this paper were pre-
sented. I gratefully acknowledge funding from USC INET and IAAE (IAAE Travel Grant). Computation
for the work described in this paper was supported by the University of Southern California’s Center for
High-Performance Computing (hpc.usc.edu). All errors and omissions are my own.
†Sciences Po, Department of Economics, 28 Rue des Saints-Pres, 75007, Paris, France. e-mail:
michele.fioretti@sciencespo.fr
1 Introduction
A lot is known about how preferences shape people’s decisions. Much less is known
about firms’ objectives. Firms are often assumed to maximize profits, and most of our
knowledge on the functioning of markets rely on this assumption. But what if firms con-
tribute to welfare also outside markets? The growth in the number of socially responsible
firms in recent years could support the idea that many firms and entrepreneurs are not
only interested in pecuniary returns but also in giving back to society.
Extrapolating firm’s objectives from their strategies is complex because of both data
requirement and interpretation issues. Oftentimes, cost data are not available or reli-
able and researchers turn to profit-maximization to back up costs from data such as mar-
ket shares and prices. Therefore, no inference on firm’s objectives is possible in such
cases. Yet, observing both revenue and cost data is not sufficient because deviations from
profit maximization may depend on aspects that could be left out of the analysis such as
managerial costs (e.g., Ellison et al., 2016, DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019), intertemporal
trade-offs (e.g., Rogerson, 1997) or behavioral biases (e.g., Ellison, 2006).
Socially responsible firms provide a fruitful context to analyze profit maximization
because the intensity of their prosocial investments could shed light on the tension be-
tween shareholders’ profits and stakeholders’ welfare (e.g., Jensen, 2001). For instance,
large pro-social investments could indicate a company’s genuine desire to contribute to
society at the expense of profit maximization. To this end, this paper studies Charitystars,
a for-profit online firm offering charity auctions of celebrities’ belongings.1 In each auc-
tion, the firm donates a fraction of the transaction price to a charity. The fraction donated
is known to consumers and is decided by the firm and the item provider (mainly celebri-
ties and charities) before the auction. This environment comes with several advantages to
empirically identify the firm’s objectives. First, social responsibility is equal to the dona-
tion and thus is particularly easy to measure and salient to consumers. Second, costs are
observed because the firm sets each reserve price to cover the cost of procuring the item.
My findings suggest that firm’s objectives could extend beyond mere profit maximiza-
tion to include also its giving. After building and structurally estimating a tailored model
of demand and supply, I show that Charitystars’s average donation (70% of the transac-
tion price) is much larger than the profit maximizing donation (less than 30%). The firm
could substantially increase its profits if it were to behave optimally.
1With offices in London, Milan and Los Angeles, Charitystars is a for-profit start-up with almost $4m
in equity. Since its foundation in 2013, the company generated over $10 million for charities and non-
profit organizations. For more information, see www.charitystars.com and on www.crunchbase.com/
organization/charitystars.
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I exclude several alternative explanations. First, I show that the customer base and the
number of auctions held do not respond to the fraction donated over time. In addition,
my empirical analysis focuses on an item category that is one of the most sought after
items on the website and for which the firm is a monopolist – properly selecting the frac-
tion donated for these items is a central issue to Charitystars’s business. Also, the firm
is not likely to have biased estimates of the price elasticity to donations because the firm
holds several auctions a year. Furthermore, being owned by private equity funds should
provide the managers with sufficient analytical power to acknowledge a modest response
of consumers to larger donations (Bloom et al., 2015).
To reconcile the generous donations observed in the data, I find that the weight that
Charitystars put on its own profits is 60%, with the remaining 40% dedicated to giving.
This finding is in line with recent results in the finance literature showing that socially
responsible institutional investors invest in less profitable firms with social impact (Barber
et al., 2019, Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). This could depend on socially responsible firms
facing lower costs of financing (Cheng et al., 2014) because socially responsible investors
forego higher returns to invest in these companies (Riedl and Smeets, 2017).
Methodologically, I exploit variation in the fraction donated to estimate both how con-
sumers’ willingness to pay and procurement costs vary with social responsibility. To es-
timate demand, I build a structural auction model where bidders’ utility is a function of
their private values for the item and their prosocial preferences (e.g., Goeree et al., 2005,
Engers and McManus, 2007). Importantly, I envision consumers as impure altruistic bid-
ders who derive utility not only from their own donations, but also from the donations
of others (Andreoni, 1988). Theoretically, this implies that transaction prices do not nec-
essarily increase when the auctioneer donates more, as bidders may prefer to loose the
auction and gain from the donations of somebody else (Leszczyc and Rothkopf, 2010).
To determine how elastic is demand to changes in the fraction donated, I show that
the primitives of the model, including the distribution of values and the charitable pref-
erences, are nonparametrically identified from the data. To gain intuition, imagine two
auctions for the same item that have different fractions donated, and think of the bids
placed in each auction by the same bidder. The difference between the donations im-
plied by the two bids reflects the benefit from winning and donating, while the difference
between the marginal increase in donations across the two auctions identifies the util-
ity from somebody else’s potential donation, an externality. Identification relies on the
restriction that the distribution of values for the item does not depend on how much is
donated. This restriction is formally tested and not rejected by the data.
The fit of the model is satisfactory with estimated expected revenues within 10% of the
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realized ones. Prices on Charitystars command a small premium as bidders’ willingness
to pay increases based on how much the firm donates. However, donations have a large
direct cost in terms of foregone revenues. A counterfactual scenario where the firm does
not donate quantifies the loss in net revenues to be as large as e 260 per listing, or about
70% of the average transaction price. Thus, looking only at the demand side, the firm
would be better-off if it ran regular non-charity auctions.
Turning to the supply side, the firm purchases the item from providers (mainly char-
ities and celebrties) previous a payment and an agreement on the fraction of the auction
price to be donated back to the charity. I exploit the fact that the firm sets the reserve
price to break-even to estimate how the procurement cost varies with the fraction do-
nated. I find that procurement costs decrease in the fraction donated, implying negative
marginal costs. This could be because of the greater publicity that charities and celebrities
receive with large fraction donated. The optimal donation is found at the intersection of
the estimated marginal net revenues and the marginal costs. The estimation shows that
the optimal donation is about 30% of the transaction price, yet the median donation in
the data is 85% (mean 70%). Charitystars would double its profits if it were to adopt the
optimal policy.
My results on both revenues and costs are supported by several related research pa-
pers. On the revenue side, I estimate modest price elasticities of the order seen in other pa-
pers studying bidder’s behavior in charity auctions (e.g., Elfenbein and McManus, 2010).
Given how salient are Charitystars’s donations for consumers, my findings suggests that
consumer demand cannot explain firms’ prosocial inclinations. This claim is also echoed
in Gartenberg et al. (2019) whose analysis of over 400 US companies find no correlation
between a firm’s measure of purpose and its sales. On the cost side, giving is profitable
because it changes Charitystars’s cost-structure. Charitystars’s money-making ability and
ethical concerns are clearly not separable. Quoting Hart et al. (2017), if consumers and in-
vestors value social donations, why “would they not want the companies they invest in to
do the same?” Socially responsible shareholders may see this company as an opportunity
to sustain their donations over time, while even receiving dividends. Under this logic,
Charitystars cares not only about its profitability but also about its total giving.
Many for-profits firms may have social impact as one of their objectives as well. This
is reflected in the recent corporate legislation reforms (“Benefit Corporation”) which was
approved in several US states and that aims to support for-profit social impact firms (Bat-
tilana and Lee, 2014).2 Nevertheless, evidence that social responsibility is conducive to
2Benefit Corporation firms (or B Corp) differ from other limited liability companies because they have
a legally binding fiduciary responsibility to take into account also the interests of the workers, the com-
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higher economic or financial return is sparse. Although Eichholtz et al. (2010) find a large
price premium (16%) for energy-efficient buildings, a meta-analysis of over 160 papers
find only a small positive correlation between investments in corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) and profits, and suggest that causation may well flow from profits to CSR
(Margolis et al., 2007). Several other issues beyond the endogeneity between CSR and
profitability plague causal inference in this domain (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2010). One
of these issues is the large heterogeneity of CSR activities, which complicates compari-
son across firms (Chatterji et al., 2009, Kotsantonis and Serafeim, 2019). Moreover, this
variation may interact in surprising ways, sometimes reducing a firm’s perceived social
impact. This happens, for example, by disseminating misleading information of envi-
ronmental friendliness (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011) and by giving to charities to influence
connected congressmen (Bertrand et al., 2018).3
To circumvent the issues presented above, I propose a novel approach based on com-
paring the intensity of a firm’s CSR stance with its profit maximizing counterpart, rather
than focusing on CSR’s extensive margin across firms as is customary in the applied lit-
erature. By focusing on a single firm I avoid comparisons across firms with different CSR
levels and, at the same time, I can show causality through the lenses of a theoretical model
of a firm that sells to socially oriented consumers (e.g., Bagnoli and Watts, 2003, Besley
and Ghatak, 2007).
This paper is related to a growing literature investigating firm’s conduct (Bresnahan,
1982). For example, Duarte et al. (2020) find that Italian cooperatives behave in the same
manner as the other for-profit supermarkets they compete with. On the other hand, Mac-
chiavello and Miquel-Florensa (2019) also show that coffee intermediaries pay Colombian
coffee farmers more than what implied by profit maximization, but explain this finding
through resale price maintenance policies rather than fair trade or social responsibility.
Principal-agency problems between shareholders and management (e.g., Hart, 1995, Lil-
jeblom et al., 2011) and managerial quality (e.g., Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, Goldfarb
and Xiao, 2011, Hortac¸su et al., 2017, Adhvaryu et al., 2018) are other classic reasons why
firms may fail to maximize profits. Suboptimal choices are also observed in the National
Football League, as certain plays called by coaches do not maximize the probability of vic-
tory (Romer, 2006), and teams often waste their top picks at the annual draft (Massey and
munity and the environment. Patagonia, Kickstarter and many subsidiaries of Danone are examples of B
Corp. For additional information on B Corp legislation see www.economist.com/business/2012/01/07/
firms-with-benefits.
3In many situations consumers cannot observe some attributes of a good or service, like for experience
goods. Researchers found that consumers use a firm’s CSR stance to update their belief about the good
(e.g., Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012, Elfenbein et al., 2012). In this cases, it is not simple to distinguish
consumers’ taste for CSR from the information asymmetry.
4
Thaler, 2013). These papers speculate that influence from shareholders and fans could
sway decisions away from optimality. Yet, empirical research providing similar evidence
with business data is lacking.4 My results fill this gap by demonstrating that firms’ deci-
sions can be influenced by concerns that are external to profits, a finding that could apply
to firms in other industries as well.
2 Auctions on Charitystars
Charitystars is a for-profit internet platform helping charities do fundraising, by offering
charity auctions of celebrities’ memorabilia. Charitystars auctions a very broad spectrum
of items, from VIP tickets to sport events to arts collectibles.5 Soccer is one of the most
popular item categories with over 4,000 auctions held in 3 years. Moreover, Charitystars
is a de facto monopolist in the market for actually worn soccer jerseys, on which I focus.
Auction format. After each Charitystars’s auctions, the auction winner win the auctioned
item and pays his bid. The transaction price is then shared between Charitystars and a
charity. The charity receiving the donation, as well as the fraction donated are known to
all bidders before the auction. Donations are guaranteed by issuing certificates.
All Charitystars’s auctions involve a single item and employ an open, ascending-bid
format analogous to eBay. Bidders can also submit cutoff bids instead of a bid. Once a
cutoff is set, Charitystars will issue a bid equal to the smallest of the standing price and
the highest submitted cutoff price, plus the minimum increment. Importantly, the auction
countdown is automatically extended by 4 minutes anytime a bid is placed in the last 4
minutes of the auction. This effectively impedes sniping (Backus et al., 2017). After each
sold soccer jersey, if a fraction q of the transaction price is donated, the firm keeps 1− q of
the price paid as net revenues.
All items are posted online on the firm’s website and advertised on the social media of
the firm in a similar fashion. The listing webpage shows pictures of the item on the left of
the screen, and bidders find a short description on the bottom of the page, together with
the information on the recipient charity. A picture of a typical webpage at the time of the
data collection is reported in Appendix Figure E2.
Procurement. Charitystars procures the memorabilia either from footballers, teams and
4In a related paper, Kolstad (2013) shows that surgeons respond more to intrinsic incentives (quality
report cards) than to monetary ones. Despite analyzing the decision of people rather than firms, the author
also finds that objectives can extend beyond profitability.
5Charitystars is owned by its funding members, who also are managers in the company, and by institu-
tional investors such as private equity firms and angel investors.
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charities or from third party sellers. The fraction donated is bargained between the firm
and the provider of the item, who may also require a payment for procuring the item.
Therefore, charities procuring the item receive both a fixed fee and a fraction donated.
Charitystars’s minimum fee is 15% of the transaction price. If the provider of the item
requires a large fixed fee, the fraction donated decreases (see Appendix Figure E2). Im-
portantly, talks with advisors and shareholders of the firm revealed that the firm sets the
reserve price in soccer jersey auctions such that the portion of the reserve price that is
kept by the firm equates procurement costs. This is a trivial way to avoid losses, due to
the complexity of setting the profit optimal reserve price.6
Data. I use publicly available data from Charitystars.com. The dataset was collected from
the website and contains auctions of authentic soccer jerseys sold between July 1, 2015 and
June 12, 2017. Figure 1 reports the number of auctions for each percentage donated. All
auctions where the fraction donated is greater than 85% are disregarded as they coincide
with special events. Throughout the paper, I let q denote the fraction donated. These
dates were chosen as they mark the beginning and the end (after the Champions League
final) of two consecutive football seasons. The dataset includes 1,583 auctions.
For each auction I observe all bids placed, the date and time of the bid, the bidder
nationality and the charity. Auctions start dates are not observed, but the average length
of Charitystars’s auctions is usually between 1 and 2 weeks. I proxy the auction length as
the days between the first bid posted and the closing day.7 I focus on listings of sold items
with at least 2 different bidders, transaction prices within e 100 and e 1,000, and with
a minimum raise not larger than e 25 (1,108 auctions in total). The average minimum
increment is less than e 2.00 and the transaction price is greater than the reserve price in
more than 95% of the listings. On average (median) the winning bid is 2.9 (2) times larger
than the reserve price. All the variables are defined in detail in Appendix B.
3 The Impact of Giving on Bidding: Empirical Evidence
The reduced form evidence in this section provides the foundation for modeling demand
in later sections by illustrating how giving impacts prices and competition across bidders.
Intensive Margin. I first investigate whether greater transaction prices are associated
with more generous donations (q). To test this hypothesis, I run a set of regressions where
the transaction price is on the left-hand side and auction characteristics, including q, are
6The reserve price is not disclosed on the website, but it can be found in the HTML code of the webpage.
Whether bidders know the reserve price does not affect the analyses.
7See Appendix Table C1 for the complete list of variables.
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on the right-hand side. Table 2 displays results from the following OLS regressions
log(pricet) = γ0 + xtγ+ γqqt + εt, (3.1)
where t indexes the auctions. The vector of covariates, x, includes all variables other than
the fraction donated, q. The columns of the table vary based on the definition of x, which
is given in the bottom panel of the table. The jerseys are quite comparable across differ-
ent fraction donated as the latter variable is not correlated with the quality of the player
wearing the auctioned jersey.8 The correlation between q and the other covariates is also
small (lower than |0.25|). The estimates suggest that a 0.1 increase in q, is associated with
a price increase between e 8.4 and e 9.4, indicating a positive and significant correlation
between bids and donations.
Since the fraction donated is bargained between the provider of the item and Chari-
tystars, γˆq could be inconsistent if bidders care for unobserved characteristics of the item
which affect the bargaining outcome (q). In this case Table 2 could erroneously suggest
that bidders care for giving, while they only care for the unaccounted characteristics.
To account for endogeneity, I instrument a listing’s reserve price and q with the av-
erage q and the average reserve price across all concurrent auctions ending within ±5
days. The instruments are valid if the concurrent auctions are not correlated after con-
trolling for covariates. To this end, the list of covariates, x, include the number of listings
of jerseys from the same team in the previous three weeks and for the same player in the
previous two weeks, as well as the type of the charity receiving the money. Therefore, po-
tential correlations across auctions due to providing multiple objects at the same time are
likely purged from the residual variation. Appendix Table D2 reports the OLS and the IV
estimates. The first-stage is greater than 10, and the hypothesis of weak-instrument is re-
jected at 0.1% level in all columns. The Sargan overidentification test performed adding
the average number of bidders across concurrent auctions as an additional instrument
does not reject the null hypothesis of exogenous IVs. The IV estimates are statistically
significant and larger than the OLS ones, but less precise.
Appendix Table D1 also reports three quantile regressions in the spirit of equation 3.1.
Appendix Figure E3 plots the coefficients. The null hypothesis that the coefficients com-
puted at the first, second and third quartiles are the same cannot be rejected at common
values (F test p-value 0.82), suggesting a linear relation between q and prices.
In conclusion, bidders seem to react to giving. In particular, a 10% change in the aver-
8To check whether jerseys worn by better players are associated with larger fraction donated, I down-
loaded player data from the FIFA videogames on the previous 5 years and checked the correlation between
q and the overall player quality. The correlation is only between -0.07 and 0, excluding this channel.
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age fraction donated results in about a 9.2% change in transaction prices. Related papers
found qualitatively comparable results. For example, Elfenbein and McManus (2010) es-
timated that prices in eBay charitable listings are on average 6% larger than comparable
non-charity ones, while within a controlled experiment Leszczyc and Rothkopf (2010)
determined that a 40% donation leads to a 40% price increase.
Extensive Margin. Bidders do not seem to prefer more generous auctions. In the data, a
total number of 2,247 bidders compete on average in 5.34 different auctions. This mean
increases to 8.51 after excluding bidders who bid in only one auction. Among bidders
placing at least 2 bids, more than 80% of them bid at least in two auctions with different
fraction donated. In addition, raw data also point to no correlation between the number
of bidders joining an auction and q (Spearman correlation is 0.0855).
I further investigate the impact of q on the extensive margin of giving with the follow-
ing Poisson regressions
log(E[number o f bidderst|xt,qt]) = γ0 + xtγ+ γqqt + log(lengtht) + εt,
where t indexes the auctions. The variable length is the exposure variable and tells how
many days the auction lasted. Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients which should be
interpreted in terms of number of bidders per day. The results confirm the absence of a
correlation between q and the number of bidders. This conclusion is also reaffirmed when
instrumenting q as previously done (Appendix Table D3).
Asymmetric Bidding. There are two main sources of asymmetry that can be tested. First,
as most jerseys belong to Italian teams (63% of the auctions) and most charities are Italian
(90% of the auctions), bidders from different nationalities could employ different bidding
strategies. However, Appendix Table D6 shows the null effect of including dummies for
the nationality of the winner. Second, some bidders can be collectors of jerseys and may
care less about the donations. I define collectors as recurrent winners who won more than
the median number of auctions won (three). Table D7 in Appendix C shows that recurrent
winners do not pay more on average.
4 Demand Model: Altruism in Charity Auctions
In a charity auction, a portion of the price paid to the auctioneer is donated to a charity. If
bidders care for charitable giving, their utility should include also how much is earned by
the charity. In this section, I extend the seminal work on price-proportional auctions by
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Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) and Engers and McManus (2007) to fit the main characteris-
tic of Charitystars’s online auctions, namely that only a fraction q < 1 of the final price
is donated. In this setting, I study both the optimal bidding strategy and the revenue
maximizing choice of q.
I model the additional utility from donating to a charity by β · q · price, where β trans-
forms the fund raised, q · price, in utils. Hence, β indicates the satisfaction from winning
the auction and donating. Though losing bidders do not consume the item, and so receive
no consumption utility, they also enjoy the fact that the charity receives funds. The reward
to the losing bidders is modeled by the term α · q · price. As charitable motives cannot ex-
plain the full amount of one’s bid, the literature assumes that α,β ∈ [0,1). Therefore, the
realized utility to a bidder who values the private good v can be summarized by
u(v;α,β,q) =
v− b + β · q · price, if i wins,α · q · price, otherwise. (4.1)
Despite its simplicity, the model implies different underlying rationale for giving depend-
ing on the relative size of α and β. Appendix Table D8 summarizes the most common
theories of altruism.
The null hypothesis is that bidders are not interested in giving. If α = β = 0, the classic
textbook equilibrium applies, and bidding is in no way shaped by altruistic preferences.
Bidders are purely altruistic when their utility does not depend on the identity of the
donor, or when α = β > 0. In this case they are solely moved by their compassionate
concern for the activities of the charity (Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2017).9
Selfish motives may also be present. For instance, bidders may take pride in donating
(e.g., Andreoni, 1989, Fisher et al., 2008). In this case, β − α > 0 implies that bidders
receive a “warm glow” when winning and donating. An extreme case is when bidders
only care for their donations and have no intrinsic motivations (β > 0 but α = 0). This
model captures the role of social status or prestige in donation (e.g., Harbaugh, 1998).10
Leszczyc and Rothkopf (2010) provide empirical evidence for α > β > 0 using a field
experiment with manipulated charity auctions to assess overbidding. In such a “volun-
teer shill” model, bidders derive more utility from others’ contributions than their own.
9A theoretical treatment of these auctions first appeared in Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), who analyzed
auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders (all bidders receive an equal share of the final price).
10β > 0, α = 0 is consistent with bidders receiving subsidies as is common in timber auctions (Athey et al.,
2013).
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4.1 How Donations Impact Bids and Revenues
To find the optimal fraction donated for the auctioneer, knowledge of how demand varies
with q is necessary. Thus, I start from examining a bidder’s optimal bidding strategy as a
function of q. The following standard assumption is maintained throughout.
Assumption 1. Regularity:
1. All n > 1 bidders have private and independent values for the auctioned item. Values are
drawn from a continuous distribution F(·) with density f (·) on a compact support [v,v];
2. The hazard rate of F(·) is increasing.
The independent private value assumption is relaxed in the estimation by the inclu-
sion of auction heterogeneity, which effectively allows for affiliated values. An alternative
would have all bidders valuing the jersey equally, but enjoying only imperfect signals of
this value before bidding. Under such a common values scenario, the winner’s course
increases in the number of bidders. As a result, bidders will shade their bids the more
bidders join the auction. However, this prediction is refused by the positive and signifi-
cant coefficients of the number of bidders in Table 2. Condition 2. of Assumption 1 relates
ensures the existence of a unique global optimum of the bidding function and identifica-
tion of the primitives of the model {F(v),α,β}.
Optimal Bid. Due to the strategic equivalence between English and second-price charity
auctions (Engers and McManus, 2007), the winning bid, and thus the transaction price, in
an ascending auction correspond to the price at which the second-highest bidder drops
out. Therefore, the expected utility to a bidder with value v in a second-price charity
auction is
E[u(v;α,β,q)] = E
[
v− (1− q · β) · price, i wins]︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
i wins and pays price
+q · α · price · Pr(i’s bid is 2nd highest)︸                                              ︷︷                                              ︸
i loses and bids bi = price
+ q · α ·E[price, i’s bid is < 2nd highest]︸                                               ︷︷                                               ︸
i loses and price > bi
,
where price is the second-highest bid. The expected utility is taken over three mutually
exclusive events. In the first brackets the bidder wins the contest, pays the second-highest
bid, enjoys v and additional utility from doing charity (β · q · price). In the second and
third brackets, the bidder either drops out as a second-highest bidder or drops out earlier.
In either case, the bidder benefit in proportion to the expected donation (α · q · price).
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Focusing on the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the second-price auction
game, the equilibrium bid for a bidder with private valuation v and charitable parameters
α and β in a symmetric second-price charity auction where the auctioneer donates q is:
b∗(v;α,β,q) =

1
1+q·(α−β)
{
v +
∫ v
v
(
1−F(x)
1−F(v)
) 1−q·β
q·α +1
dx
}
, if α > 0 and q > 0,
v
1−q·β , if α = 0 or q = 0.
(4.2)
This bid function is also optimal in ascending online auctions: in equilibrium a bidder
with value v drops out of the auction when price ≥ b(v;α,β,q). Equation 4.2 shows no
discontinuity as α goes to 0. Interestingly, the optimal bid function is to bid truthfully as
in the textbook second-price auction with non-charitable bidders (b(v;0,0,q) = v).
Comparative Statics on q. Does greater fraction donated necessarily increase bids? From
equation 4.2 this is necessarily true if α = 0. In this case, a marginal increase in q is
equivalent to a marginal increase in β, implying greater satisfaction from winning the
auction, leading to greater bids. More generally, whether bids increase or decrease with q
depends on the model of giving, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If β ≥ α then ∂b(·;q)/∂q > 0. If α > β then ∃ v˜ ∈ [v,v] s.t. ∂b(·;q)/∂q < 0 ∀ v ∈
(v˜,v].
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Under warm glow (β ≥ α) all bidders revise up their bids if q increases. This is de-
picted by the solid line in Figure 2a. The dotted and dashed lines instead refer to the
derivative of bids w.r.t. q for the voluntary shill model (β < α): bids increase for bidder
with low values, and increase for bidders with high values.
Due to the monotonic bidding strategies, bidders with high values are possible win-
ners of the auction. A marginal change in q has two effects if α is large enough. First,
it intensifies the degree of substitution between winning the auction and gaining from
somebody else’s contribution to the charity (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006). The substitution
effect is greater for high-value bidders, and so they are the ones to revise their bids down.
Second, low-value bidders affect their payoff only when they rank as the second-highest
bidder. Thus, as their bid is complementary to that of a greater winning bidder, they raise
their bid in the hope to extract more surplus from the winner. A comparison of the dotted
and dashed lines in Figure 2a supports this idea: more low value bidders increase their
bids when they believe they are more likely to rank-high in the auction. This happens
when the variance of the distribution of private values is greater (dotted line).
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Therefore, in a charity auction, optimal bids must balance not only the intensive mar-
gin (a bidder’s surplus) with the extensive margin (the probability of winning), but also
an additional margin represented by free-riding.
Net Revenues and q. If the cost of procuring the item is sunk, a profit-maximizer auc-
tioneer should set the fraction donated to maximize net revenues, or (1− q) times price.
The revenue-optimal fraction donated qR depends on the demand parameters {F(v),α,β}.
In particular, when α = 0, increasing q does not increase net revenues to the auctioneer,
because the term q · β · price act as a discount factor. Net revenues are lower than non-
charity auction revenues and the auctioneer should not donate.
Charity auctions are more appealing to the auctioneer in case of cross-bidders exter-
nalities (α > 0).11 However, α should be small enough to prevent high-value bidders from
excessively shading their bids. The next proposition determines the fraction donated, qR,
that maximizes net revenues.
Proposition 1. Define η(pe,q) = ∂p
e
∂q
q
pe as the elasticity of the expected price, p
e, to the donation,
q. When α = 0, the auctioneer should not donate. When α > 0, the revenue maximizing donation
solves η(pe(qR),qR) =
qR
1−qR .
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Intuitively, net revenues first increase as the auctioneer increases q, reach a maximum,
before decreasing to zero, as when q = 1 the auctioneer donates all he or she makes. Net
revenues have an inverted-U shape which is maximized at qR. The ratio q/(1− q) is the
ratio of what is donated to what is kept, and is convex in q. The firm will increase its
donation rate until the marginal benefit from higher bids ((1− q)η) equates the marginal
cost from donating an extra euro (q). This is evident from Figure 2b, where net revenues
(right axis) are optimized at the q that sets η = q/(1− q).
Discussion. The previous theoretical exercises should be read in light of the lack of agree-
ment in the empirical literature assessing the effect of donations on prices and revenues in
charity auctions. For instance, Leszczyc and Rothkopf (2010) attributed the widespread
overbidding in their experimental charity over non-charity auctions to large externalities.
However, their conclusion that α > β implies greater revenues is only partially true as
it also requires enough incentives for low value bidders to place high bids as shown in
Figure 2a. This seems to be the case in their data as their auctions averaged less than 4
11The result on the auctioneer’s surplus mimics how donations impact bidders’ surplus. When α = 0,
the expected bidders’ surplus in a charity and non-charity auctions are the same. Thus the auctioneer
cannot extract additional rents from holding a charity auction. Instead, bidders’ surplus is greater in charity
auctions if α > 0. Proposition A1 in Appendix A.3 presents a formal proof.
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bidders. In contrast, another field experiment with more than 15 potential bidders in each
auction found charitable prices to sink below non-charity ones at a school charity auction
(Carpenter et al., 2008). Given Proposition 1 this can be explained in terms of high exter-
nalities as parents (bidders) may care more for the fundraising of the school than their
own donations.
5 Nonparametric Identification of Demand
To assess Charitystars’s objectives it is central to establish the identification of the primi-
tives of the model, {F(v),α,β}. Take the following example: two identical auctions with
different fractions donated are observed. A mere comparison of prices across auctions
could lead to errors. For instance, if the prices are sufficiently close, we could infer that
bidders are not altruistic. Instead, high-value bidders could be shading their bids in the
auction with the higher fraction donated due to large externalities (Proposition 1). I first
show identification in second-price charity auctions and then in Charitystars’s auctions.
Second-Price Auctions. Identification relies on variation in the fraction donated (q) across
otherwise identical auctions and exploits both the information in the first-order condi-
tions of optimal bidding and the monotonicity of the bid function. In what follows, de-
note the observed distribution of bids by G(b(v;α,β,q);q), and the related inverse hazard
rate by λG(b(v;α,β,q);q).12 Since the bids are invertible functions of private values, the
distribution of bids is equal to the distribution of private values.13 I use the last equiva-
lence to write the FOC of a bidder with value v bidding b(v;α,β,q) as
v = ξ (b;α,β,q) = (1− β · q) · b(v;α,β,q) + α · q ·
(
b(v;α,β,q)− λG(b(v;α,β,q);q)
)
. (5.1)
The equation shows that the private value must balance the own payment in case of
victory plus the surplus that can be extracted if somebody else wins with a larger bid.
The unknowns are v on the left-hand side and α and β on the right-hand side. Despite
F(v) is identified directly from the empirical distribution of bids (Gˆ(b)), one can plug
different combinations of {α, β} in equation 5.1 and obtain the same F(v). A similar
non-identification result holds in the estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions, in
which case identification relies on either parametric quantile restrictions or cross-auction
12The inverse hazard rate of the bid distribution is λG(b(v;α,β,q);q) =
1−G(b(v;α,β,q);q)
g(b(v;α,β,q);q) , while the inverse
hazard rate of the distribution of private values is λF(v) =
1−F(v)
f (v) .
13Under Assumption 1 the following relations hold: G(B) = Pr(b(v) < B) ≡ Pr(v < b−1(B)) =
F(b−1(B)). Therefore, G(b(v;α,β,q);q) = F(v). It follows that g(b(v))b′(v) = f (v).
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variation on the number of bidders (e.g., Lu and Perrigne, 2008, Guerre et al., 2009, Campo
et al., 2011). However, these restrictions are of no use for nonparametric identification in
English charity auctions as, for instance, the number of bidders does not even appear in
the FOCs.
However, the right-hand side of (5.1) is strictly increasing and differentiable in b(v;α,β,q),
and thus there are no two different combinations of α and β yielding the same vector of
pseudo-private values v.14 This remark ensures that every distribution F(.|α˜, β˜,q) (one for
each α˜, β˜ combination given q) is unique by Theorem 1 in Guerre et al. (2000).15 Therefore,
if two sets of auctions, A and B, with different fraction donated, qA , qB, are observed, the
distribution of private values computed on each set of auctions using (5.1) must be the the
same at the true parameters {α0,β0}. Thus, {α0,β0} are nonparametrically identified by
F(.|α0,β0,qA) = F(.|α0,β0,qB). This strategy fails if, for instance, high valued bidders sys-
tematically join auctions with greater fractions donated, and so the following assumption
is required:
Assumption 2. Identification: F(·) does not depend on q.
The identification restriction states that bidders’ consumption utility, v, does not de-
pend on the franction donated. The model shown in Section 4 automatically satisfies this
assumption, because it defines F(v) as the unconditional distribution of private values.
Section 3 finds that Charitystars’s bidders do in fact bid in multiple auctions without re-
gard for q. Also, the same section shows no correlation between the number of bidders,
other auction characteristics and q. Upon estimation of the model, I also formally test the
validity of Assumption 2 (see Section 6.2).
Charitystars’s Auctions. Not all bids are observed in Charitystars’s auctions. First, the
equivalence between English auctions and button auctions may not hold for those bidders
who forgot to update their bids. Second, in equilibrium the winner pays a small increment
over the price at which the second-highest bidder quits bidding.16 Although the reported
winning bid does not solve 5.1 for the winning bidder, it solves it for the second-highest
bidder, as the winner wins the auction at the price at which the second-highest bidder
drops out. As a result, although F(v) is not identified by the empirical distribution of
bids (e.g., Gˆ(b;q)), it is identified from the empirical distribution of the winning bids (e.g.,
Gˆw(b;q)). In equilibrium, the latter distribution is a function of the F(v) and the number
14The term in parentheses of (5.1) is increasing in b if f ′(v) > − f (v)21−F(v) + g(b; ·)b′′(v; ·), which is always
true because of Assumption 1. This is also confirmed in the data.
15Theorem 1 in Guerre et al. (2000) relies on the same regularity conditions in Assumption 1.
16The minimum increment in Charitystars is e 1 for most auctions.
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of bidders, identifying F(v) directly from the data.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, {F(v),α,β} are nonparametrically identified by
observing two identical auctions with different fractions donated.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Proposition 2 can also be extended to include a finite number of auction types (e.g.,
q ∈ {q1,q2, ...,qK}), as shown in Corollary 1 in Appendix A.6. The proof uses the panel
structure of the data to create a projection matrix that cancels out the left-hand side of
equation 5.1 to identify α and β as in Proposition 2.
6 Estimation of the Demand Model
In this section I first lay out the estimation routine, which closely follows the identification
in Proposition 2. Section 6.2 reports the results and fit of the model, and Section 6.3
quantifies the charity premium.
6.1 Structural Estimation
Following the main identification result, the primitives of the model {F(v),α,β} are esti-
mated comparing two auctions with different fraction donated, q. Clearly, identification
fails if the two fractions donated are dangerously close to each other as the necessary rank
condition would not hold.17 According to Figure 1, the most frequent fraction donated in
Charitystars’s data are 10%, 78% and 85%. Thus, estimation is performed on a sample of
auctions with q ∈ {10%,85%}.
Estimation is performed in three steps. The first step accounts for auction heterogene-
ity. In the second step, I determine the distribution of bids and construct the FOCs. The
primitives are estimated in the third step of the routine.
First Step. I account for auction heterogeneity through a flexible regression of the log of
transaction prices on auctions, item and charity characteristics according to the following
regression of the transaction price on covariates
log(pricet) = γ0 + xtγ+ bw,t, (6.1)
where t indexes the auctions and x includes all the variables in column 1 in Table 2, ex-
17Appendix Table G1 reports Monte Carlo simulations showing that the estimated {αˆ, βˆ} are not consis-
tent if qA is too close to qB.
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cluding q. The residual, bˆw,t, are interpreted as pseudo-winning bids from homogeneous
auctions (e.g., Haile et al., 2003), and are a function of α, β, q and winners’ private values.
The estimates of (6.1) are in Appendix Table D9. While I am not controlling for un-
observed heterogeneity directly, I am doing so indirectly. In particular, the number of bids
placed (given the number of bidders and the length of the auction) tells the level of compe-
tition across bidders within an auction that is not explained by x. If the auction is more
appealing for some unobservable characteristics, bidders are likely to control the auctions
more closely than predicted by x. The increased supervision will result in more bids by
the same bidders, and as a result, will account for unobserved quality.
Second Step. The distribution and density of bids are necessary to build the FOCs as
in equation 5.1. Because of jump bidding, I first group bˆw,t based on q (either 10% or
85%) and determine the distribution of bids, Gˆq(b), from the empirical distribution of the
winning bid, Gˆqw(b), for each group of auctions. The density gˆq(b) is computed similarly.18
To compute the empirical CDF and pdf of bˆw,t, I use a Gaussian kernel with bandwidths
as in Li et al. (2002).19
Third Step. I build two sets of FOCs as in equation 5.1 based on whether q = 10% or
q = 85%. I match each FOC for the auctions with q = 10% with a FOC of the auctions at
85% along the quantiles of the distributions of bids, i.e. FOCs with bids b10% and b85% are
matched if Gˆ10%(b10%) = Gˆ85%(b85%). In this way the left-hand side vˆq for each FOC is
equal to its matched counterpart at the true {α,β}, implying that at each τ quantile of the
distribution of values vˆ10%τ − vˆ85%τ = 0. The criterion function is:
min
{α,β}
1
T
T
∑
τ
(
vˆ10%τ ({α,β})− vˆ85%τ ({α,β})
)2, (6.2)
where T is the number of auctions with q = 10%, under the constraint that {α,β} are
in [0,1]. The distribution of private values F(v) is found as the empirical distribution
computed on the left-hand side of equation 5.1, once the estimated {αˆ, βˆ} are plugged
in.20
18The distribution of bids Gˆq(b) is the solution to Gˆqw(b) = nGˆq(b)n−1 − (n− 1)Gˆq(b)n, while its density
gˆq(b) solves gˆqw(b) = n(n− 1)Gˆq(b)n−2[1− Gˆq(b)]gˆq(b), where gˆqw(b) is the empirical pdf computed on bˆw,t.
19The bandwidth of the kernel estimators are hqg = cq · T−1/5q for pdfs and hqG = ca · T−1/4q for CDFs.
cq = 1.06 ·min{σa, IQRa/1.349}, Tq is the number of auctions, σq is the standard deviation and IQRq is the
interquantile range of bˆqw,t for auctions with fraction donated q. I trim the data to deal with bias at the
extreme of bˆw,t supports.
20Appendix F performs a number of MonteCarlo simulations suggesting that the estimator is consistent
and asymptotically normal.
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6.2 Estimation Results
Table 4 reports the results of the estimation. The identification requires a constant number
of potential bidders to perform the inversion in the second step. To avoid outliers, I set
the potential number of bidders at the 99th-quantile of the distribution of bidders (first
row), and report estimates for various values of n. The 95% confidence interval are also
reported in square brackets and are obtained by bootstrap. The estimates hardly vary
with the number of potential bidders and are always significant. Consistent with other
studies (see also DellaVigna et al., 2012, Huck et al., 2015), the results provide evidence for
warm glow agents because β > α > 0 (see Section 4).
Expected Revenues. I first examine the prices implied by the model. To recover the
expected price in an auction with n bidders, I plug the estimated primitives {F(v),α,β}
in the bid equation 4.2 and integrate it with respect to the density of the second-highest
bid. In all the following analyses, I compute values in euros by summing back the median
values of the covariates in equation 6.1 (x · γˆ) to the expected price and exponetiating it.21
The differences between the observed prices across auctions with q = 10% and q =
85% are not statistically different with the expected average prices at the median num-
ber of bidders. In particular, the model predicts the expected price to be e 388.73 when
q = 85% while the average observed price when q = 85% and n = 7 is e 375.50, a 3.5%
deviation (p-value: 0.613). Similarly, the model predicted expected price when q = 10%
and n = 7 is e 353.87, whereas the average price in the data is e 327.44, a 8.1% deviation
(p-value: 0.516). The model also adequately predict prices for other number of bidders
as shown in Appendix Figure E5, where I vary the number of bidders between 5 and 10,
which corresponds to the interquantile range of the number of bidders.
Test to Identification. The estimation procedure relies on Assumption 2, which states that
F(v) does not depend on q. A direct test to this assumption is to apply the estimated coef-
ficients in the first step and the estimated αˆ and βˆ to a set of auctions with q < {10%,85%}.
Identification fails if the implied distribution of values differ from the estimated Fˆ(v).
I apply this procedure to the auctions with q = 78%. Figure 3 compares this counter-
factual density of private values (dotted line) with the estimated densities from the auc-
tions at 10% (solid line). The two pdfs have similar shapes and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test does not reject the null hypothesis of equality at 0.1874 level. This is a rather con-
servative test because the way auction heterogeneity impact prices in the auctions with
q = 78% does not need to be the same as for the other auctions (q ∈ {10%,85%}).
21I exclude the number of bidders from x because it is already accounted for in the computation of the
winning bid.
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Overidentification Test. To investigate whether bidders have different altruistic param-
eters, I perform a simple overidentification test in Appendix Figure E6a. I group the
moments in (6.2) based on whether they refer to quantiles above or below the median,
and estimate α and β for each sample. The plot compare the densities implied by the two
sets of altruistic parameters. The null hypothesis that the two pdfs are the same cannot
be rejected, meaning that the symmetric bidding assumption is supported in the data.
Instrumental Variables. As in Section 3, I correct for potential endogeneity in the reserve
price using instrumental variables. In particular, following the discussion in Section 3, I
instrument a listing’s reserve price with the average reserve price and the average number
of bids placed across all the other auctions ending within five days of the auction. Ap-
pendix Table D10 shows little change both in the estimated α and β. The F-test is 33.269,
and the overidentification test statistics (Sargan test) has a p-value of 0.192.
Linearity of Bids. In Section 2 I show the existence of a linear relation between prices and
fraction donated. Figure E6b replicates this finding by plotting the simulated bids (y axis)
for different fraction donated (x axis). The three curves (corresponding to the bids placed
by bidders with values at different deciles of the estimated F(·)) are linear and increasing
in q (compare with Appendix Table D1 and Figure E3)
Collectors. Appendix Figure E4 shows that the pseudo-winning bid of collectors (as de-
fined in Section 2) from (6.1) is not statistically different from that of non-collectors.
6.3 Does Giving Increase Net Revenues to Charitystars?
The existence of a charity premium is largely debated in the literature on charity-linked
goods as, for instance, some online sellers with low reputations donate to charities to
look more reputable (Elfenbein et al., 2012). I leverage on the structural model to cleanly
estimate the charity premium and extend the counterfactual analysis to address whether
donations increase cashflows to Charitystars.
Charity Premium. Appendix Figure E7 shows that the distribution of bids (dotted line)
stochastically dominates that of private values (solid line). Therefore, the expected trans-
action price is larger than the second-highest private value. The charity markup (dashed
line, right axis) is shown in Figure 4a as the percentage difference between the second-
highest bid in charity auctions (solid line) over the second-highest private value (dotted
line) for different fraction donated. Although the markup increases with q it is capped at
15%. This is close to the estimates in Elfenbein and McManus (2010) of a 12% premium
when the auctioneer donates 100% from eBay’s Giving Works data. On the other hand,
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although Elfenbein et al. (2012) find that eBay bidders leave a 6% markup for a 10% do-
nation, I find almost no charity premium when the auctioneer donates little. Therefore,
Charitystars’s demand is inelastic despite consumers’ willingness to pay increases in q.
Revenue Maximizing q. Figure 4b confirms that the estimated elasticity of demand to
the fraction donated (solid line) is extremely rigid. Proposition 1 states that the revenue
maximizing fraction donated is found at the intersection of the elasticity curve and the
q/(1− q) curve (dotted line). The two curves intersect at q = 0: net revenues are beyond
e 300 when the firm does not donate, and constantly decrease as q grows (dashed line,
right axis). Charitystars can increase its net revenues by as much as e 250 on average by
holding standard auctions. To address why the firm donates the next section explores
how donations impact marginal costs and profits.
7 Procurement Costs and the Profit Optimal Donation
Charitystars may find profitable to donate if procurement costs are decreasing in the frac-
tion donated. In this section, I first report empirical evidence of bargaining between
Charitystars and the providers (mainly celebrities and charities). Bargaining was also
confirmed by conversations with advisors of the firm. Leveraging on this knowledge, I
then turn to the cost of procuring the item and the profit-optimal donation.
Evidence of Bargainig. I first provide empirical evidence of bargaining. I exploit a pe-
riod of the year where the relevant bargaining power is tilted toward the providers. In
the inactive summer months of July and August, the main European soccer leagues are
off, and, as objects becomes scarcer, item providers should be more powerful. The data
indicate that the average fraction donated in the Summer months is significantly larger
than in the remaining months (Welch tests: q¯August = 0.775, q¯other = 0.698, with a one-
sided p-value = 0.030, and q¯July&August,= 0.770 q¯other = 0.693, with a one-sided p-value
< 0.001). To control for other variables I run the following OLS regressions
qt = γ0 + xtγ+ γmmontht + εt, (7.1)
where “month” refers to either the month of August, or to both July and August. Table 5
reports the results, confirming the presence of bargaining between parties, as Charitystars
is more generous when it has less bargaining power. The results are robust to the inclusion
of more covariates (even columns).
However, Charitystars could donate more to stimulate more bidders to join the auc-
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tion in these Summer months, where the soccer leagues are inactive (though Table 3 sug-
gests a null effect of changes in q on the extensive margin). To solve this potential endoe-
geneity, I use a similar instrument variable approach to that in Section 2. I instrument the
reserve price and the number of bidders (the mean of these variables for auctions hap-
pening within five days of each auctions). Appendix Table D4 shows that the coefficients
of the IV regressions are very similar to the OLS regressions. The F-statistic indicate a suf-
ficiently strong first-stage (though the F-statistic is slightly below 10 in column 4) and the
hypothesis of weak IV is rejected in all columns. I also perform the Sargan test of overi-
dentification by including the average number of displayed pictures across concurrent
auctions, and do not reject the null.
Estimation of Procurement Costs. Let’s turn to the optimal decision of a profit maxi-
mizing charitable auctioneers, who must select the fraction donated to maximize profits,
knowing that costs vary with how much is donated. Given knowledge of the number of
bidders, α,β and F(v), the problem of the auctioneer is
q∗ = arg max
q∈[0,1]
∫
v
(1− q)b(v,α,β,q)dF(2)
(n)(v)− c(q)
where F(2)
(n)(v) is the distribution of the second highest private value out of the n bidders.
Denoting the expected price by pe and its elasticity to the donation by η, it yields
c′(q) = 1− q
q
ηpe − pe. (7.2)
The optimal donation equates a change in costs due to marginal increase in q with the
relative change in net revenues. In Appendix A.7, I extend the monopolist problem above
to to allow for bargaining over the fraction donated between the firm and the provider
of the item within the framework of Nash bargaining. The model yields an equation
similar to (7.2) showing that, under the mild condition that the net expected price is larger
than the costs to the auctioneer, costs are decreasing in q. Comparing the net revenue
maximizing donation from Proposition 1, qR, and the profit optimal donation, q∗, implies
that q∗ > qR if c′(q) < 0. From Figure 4b I know that qR = 0 and if c′(·) < 0, Charitystars
correctly set q∗ > 0. This shows the importance of the cost channel on the profitability of
social responsible programs (Hart et al., 2017).
To avoid losses, Charitystars ensures that the smallest net revenue from a sale covers
costs. Thus, the firm sets the reserve price such that (1− q) · reserve price = c(q). I exploit
this key information provided by the firm and estimate the average marginal costs across
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auctions as follows. First, I homogenize the reserve prices by regressing them on the same
covariates previously used in the first step of the estimation procedure
log(reserve pricet) = xtγ+ εt, (7.3)
where t indexes each one of the 1,109 auctions in the dataset (including all auctions
such that q ≤ 0.85). Second, I exponentiate the sum of the median fitted reserve price
( ̂reserve pricet) and the error terms (εˆt), so that the homogenized reserve price (rt) is ex-
pressed in terms of the median auction in euro (as in Section 6.3).22 Third, costs are equal
to the net homogenized reserve price, ct = (1− q)rt. Hence, I obtain marginal costs by
regressing ct on q using a polynomial expansion for q (i.e., ∑
J
j=0pijq
j where j is the order
of each polynomial).
Once again, the variable number of total bids placed is helpful to account for unobserv-
able heterogeneity in equation 7.3. If in some auctions the firm sets the reserve price
above costs to limit entry in the auction to high value bidders because some unobserv-
able attributes of the item make it particularly appealing, the increased competition in
the auction (given the number of bidders and length of the auction) will be reflected in the
number of bids placed by the same bidders.
Table 6 gives the estimated coefficients using either a quadratic or a cubic functional
form for costs. Comparing the two columns, the estimated intercept (pi0) and linear co-
efficient (pi1) are similar, while the introduction of the cubic term (pi3) inflates the size of
the quadratic coefficient (pi2) in the second column. Although the coefficients are similar
across columns, adding the cubic term inflates the standard errors in column (II). This
depends on a small number of auctions for q in the neighborhood of 50%. Nevertheless,
both specifications seem to fit the data fairly well as they explain a large portion of the
variance of the net reserve price.
The Profit-Maximizing Fraction Donated. Figure 5a plots marginal costs and marginal
net revenues. The plots shows two main results. First, there is an interior solution for
q∗ and thus donating maximizes profits. This happens because the estimated marginal
costs are negative across both specifications for all q, implying that costs decrease in the
fraction donated. In addition, a marginal increase in q lowers costs less with large q: the
cost reduction follows the logic of decreasing returns. Second, even accounting for costs,
large donations cannot be justified: q∗ is only 0.25. By setting the donation optimally,
Charitystars would substantially increase its profits per unit sold. The median amount
22To test the impact of auction heterogeneity on q∗, I replicate the analysis in Appendix E where I consider
the 1st and 3rd quartiles of auction heterogeneity (xtγ) instead of the median auction.
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pocketed by Charitystars is only 15% for each object sold, yielding an expectation of about
e 40 of profit for each auction. Figure 5b shows that profits would jump to e 125 per
auction on average with the optimal policy. Average profits almost double when the
optimal donation is compared to the average donation (70%).
8 Discussion
The demand and supply analyses found that consumers’ willingness to pay does not
increase enough when the firm donates, and that donating is profitable only because it
comes with cost reductions. Yet, the firm average donation is well beyond the profit max-
imizing amount. In this section, I discuss these findings and provide additional evidence
to link them to the firm’s objectives.
Demand for Charity-linked Products. On the demand side, the price increase does not
compensate for the amount donated though consumers do pay in excess to their private
values when the firm donates to charities. I provide a conceptual framework to interpret
this result in Section 4. Because one’s donation contribute to the surplus of all consumers,
bidders may prefer others to purchase the item and donate if the externalities are large
enough. In this case, the theoretical model successfuly explains why donations are often
a small fraction of the price tag and, depending on the externality, net revenues can be
below non-charity revenues.
Although I look exclusively at soccer jerseys, the results could be relevant for charity-
linked products more broadly because of the saliency and ease of measurement of Char-
itystars’s social responsibility. Consider the case of Product Red, a charity fighting HIV
in Africa, and whose fundraising comes from charity-linked groups from large corpora-
tions, such as Apple. For each transaction, Product Red only keeps a small portion of the
price consumers pay. For instance, Montblanc Product Red trolleys currently sell for $865,
of which only $5 go to Product Red. Much larger donations would have been expected if
either consumer were to update their willingness to pay substantially or more consumers
would be interested in purchasing the item because of the charitable element. Similarly,
Tom Shoes, a shoe company which used to donate a pair of shoes for each pair sold, has
recently reverted to a much more flexible $1 donation for every $3 it makes as the old
one-for-one donation scheme was too expensive.23
One may argue that these posted-price environments are different from Charitystars’s
auctions, where bidders can decide how much to donate by increasing their bids. Yet,
23Source: https://media01.toms.com/static/www/images/landingpages/TOMS_Impact/TOMS_2019_
Global_Impact_Report.pdf, page 69.
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my claim is also supported by experimental evidence. Gneezy et al. (2010) investigate
the willingness to pay for a photograph right after riding a roller coasterlike attraction in
a US amusement park. They compare the posted price plus fixed contribution strategy
with the pay-as-you-want plus a 50% donation strategy: profits-per-ride net of donations
are non-statistically different between treatment and control groups, further supporting
a very limited role of demand in incentivizing firms to behave prosocially.
Supply and the Profitability of Giving. On the supply side, I first show theoretically
that bargaining between the firm and the item provider implies decreasing marginal pro-
curement costs. Then, I leverage on the way the firm sets reserve prices to recover how
procurement costs vary with the fraction donated. Despite the cost-analysis is specific to
Charitystars’s business model, its teachings can be applied more generally, as they prove
the importance of synergies between social responsibility programs and a firm cost struc-
ture (Hart et al., 2017). For instance, a parallel can be drawn with concrete production,
which accounts for 5-7% of greenhouse emissions globally. The diffusion of technologies
capable of capturing CO2 emissions from concrete production and infusing it back in the
concrete as a substitute for a portion of cement help curbing both emissions and produc-
tion costs (e.g., Hasanbeigi et al., 2012).24 After all, socially responsible construction firms
may be solving a similar problem as Charitystars.
Put together, the two analyses find that Charitystars correctly donates to charities, but
that it donates too much. The data suggests that the optimal fraction donated should be
on average ca. 25%, while the firm average donation is 70%. Next, I put forward potential
explanations for this result and discuss them empirically.
Omitted Variables. The reserve price and the fraction donated are equilibrium outcomes:
unobserved variables influencing the choice of reserve prices and fractions donated could
lead to misleading conclusions. For instance, the cost estimates may not be reliable if the
firm were to systematically set greater reserve prices for items with certain unobserved
characteristics. To account for this, I instrument the reserve price in the demand model
with the average reserve price and the average number of bids placed in concurrent auc-
tions (±5 days). Similarly, I instrument the fraction donated in the supply model with the
average fraction donated and the average number of bids placed. Appendix E provides
a discussion of the instrumental approach, including testing of the instruments. Coun-
terfactual analysis from this model confirms that the optimal fraction donated is 0.33 and
that the firm could substantially increase profits (Appendix Figure F3).
I present similar results in Appendix E by adding more covariates to both demand
24See also https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/12/technology/concrete-carboncure/index.html?
utm_medium=social&utm_source=fbmoney&utm_content=2018-06-12T21:32:52
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and supply analyses (Appendix Figure F1) and by considering different levels of auction
heterogeneity other than the median auction (Appendix Figure F4). The details are in
Appendix E.
Reputation and Item Providers. At a first sight, a strategy that reconciles Charitystars
behavior could be to use the high-fraction donated auctions to gain reputation and build
a larger bidder base, while making profits on low-fraction donated auctions. This strategy,
however, does not stand closer inspection.25
According to this thesis, a larger q would improve reputation. In turn, the number of
bidders and the number of auctions will grow (e.g., Marra, 2019). First, Section 3 suggests
a limited impact of donations on the extensive margin. Second, looking at monthly data
from 2015 to 2019, Appendix Figure E8 displays no increasing trend in both the number of
auctions held and the median number of bidders, suggesting that these two dimensions
do not react to changes in q. I further test whether the average fraction donated in a given
week correlates with the number of bidders or the number of auctions, respectively in
Appendix Tables D11 and D12. Using different lags, the fraction donated in a week has
no impact on either the average, the median or the 8th decile of the distribution of the
number of bidders in future weeks, or the number of auctions.26
Furthermore, auctions with very low fraction donated (e.g., 10%) do not necessarily
results in greater profits to the firm because the firm sustains greater costs to acquire these
items. In addition, if the debated thesis were true, we would expect to observe a sepa-
rating equilibrium based on the type of item provider, with certain providers bunching
at low q and others bunching at high q. However, this is not true in the data. For in-
stance, the standard deviation of the fraction donated in the whole data is 0.27, while it is
0.26 for items provided directly by charities, showing that the variation in q in the whole
sample is similar to that for charities only. I study the optimal fraction donated for the
auctions where the provider is known in Appendix E (672 auctions). Among these auc-
tions, I observe whether the item is provided by a charity directly (472 auctions) or by
footballers and coaches. Appendix F2 confirms that even further subsetting the data, the
firm optimal average donation is only 30% of the transaction price.27
25Even under the assumption that the auctions at 85% had a different status and Charitystars were to
make no cost gains on them, Charitystars would more than double its profits by setting the fraction donated
optimally compared to what it currently does.
26These results also hold with monthly, instead of weekly, level data as well as different deciles of the
distribution of the number of bids.
27Although it would be interesting to perform this analysis for each charity, it is not feasible because I
only observe a few auctions per each charity. A potential explanation for the variation in q is that small
charities could be more risk adverse, making them favour low fraction donated and higher fixed fees.
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Competition. Charitystars is a de facto monopolist in the e-commerce of footballers’
belongings because of the large number and variety of auctions it offers.28 There are also
large barriers to entry in Charitystars’s business due to the need for a sizable network of
contacts with celebrities, and for a large number of users.
Understanding Elasticities. Failure to properly assess the elasticity of prices to the frac-
tion donated is another possible explanation to Charitystars’s large donations. However,
this explanation seems unlikely for multiple reasons. First, the firm hosts thousands of
auctions yearly, and therefore it has sufficient data to establish how prices change with
the fraction donated. Second, a portion of Charitystars’s equity is hold by private equity
funds, who are generally well-equipped in terms of data analysis tools (Bloom et al., 2015).
Multiple Purchases. Charitystars’s large donations could be optimal to stir users to other
areas of the business, such as selling a painting, or a dinner with a CEO. Yet, conversation
with the firm reveal that most users in the dataset have a particular interest in soccer
jerseys, and that bidders do not bid across multiple item chategory. In addition, since
they are scattered around the world, there are large transaction costs in bidding for certain
items such as exclusive event, like a dinner with a celebrity.
Managerial Costs. Managerial costs at setting multiple donation percentages for different
business areas could explain Charitystars’s behavior (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019).
Nevertheless, selling soccer jerseys is the most active area of the Charitystars’s business
and should probably have priority over the other products sold by Charitystars.
Social Objectives of For-Profit Firms. As the smocking gun cannot be found among the
potential explanations surveyed so far, I advance the following interpretation: Charitys-
tars is not only interested in its own profits, but also in how much it donates. Fitting the
data to reconcile such a large average donation (70% of the price), the weight that Chari-
tystars’s utility places on its own profit is 60%, with the remaining 40% weight dedicated
to charities’ fundraising.
The steady growth of corporate social responsibility programs across both large and
small businesses (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2010, Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012) calls into
question whether the sole purpose of these activities is to foster profits. Socially responsi-
ble shareholders may demand that the firms they invest in behave accordingly to higher
social standards (Hart et al., 2017). A recent literature demonstrates that “social investors”
are willing to trade-off pecuniary and social returns and that this trade-off is rooted in dif-
28Charitybuzz, a large American charity auction website, is not present in Europe, which is Charitystars’s
main market (see Appendix Table D5 for a breakdown of top bidders by nationality), and does not offer
charity auctions of soccer jerseys.
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ferent preferences (Riedl and Smeets, 2017, Barber et al., 2019). From this point of view, ac-
cess to private capital may be easier for Charitystars if it pledges to donate large amounts
on average, explaining why the firm is so generous. In particular, Dyck et al. (2018) shows
that social responsible firms are more likely to be owned by institutional investors than
other firms. Charitystars’s shareholders include the founding members and private eq-
uity firms, which could see investing in low-return Charitystars as a cheap way to adver-
tise itself to potential investors.
Implications are many. First, empirical analyses comparing returns to firms at the op-
posite extremes of some indices of corporate social responsibility may fail to capture the
right relation between social responsibility and profits, not just because of endogeneity on
whether to be socially responsible or not, but also because the size of socially responsible
investments may reflect different prosocial preferences. This observation may explain the
many conflicting results in the CSR literature (e.g., Margolis et al., 2007, Eccles et al., 2014),
as to an absurd extreme, we would conclude that social responsibility decreases profits if
all socially responsible firms invest beyond what is profit optimal.
Second, there are several welfare consequences from competition across non-profit
maximizing firms. Market competition will be impacted to the extent that socially re-
sponsible firms are sheltered from market forces, which could help them to charge higher
prices as in Figure 4a. A drop in competition can result in higher consumer prices or
even less investment in research and development. Although several theoretical models
to analyze competitions across these firms have been already advanced (e.g., Besley and
Ghatak, 2007), the empirical research lags behind.
Lastly, socially responsible firms contribute to welfare by generating public goods, and
consumer cooperatives in several countries have fiscal advantages for their contributions
(Duarte et al., 2020). Consider Yoobi, a US start-up producing school supplies which also
donates supplies to schools.29 Should these benefit corporations be treated differently
fiscally? On the other hand, BP, an oil giant, contributed $1bn to the environment in
2018.30 If it makes sense to sustain firms that give back to society, where do we draw
the line between Yoobi and BP? Addressing these questions is of growing importance
as legislators worldwide are pushing for rules to support social responsible firms and
entrepreneurs.31
29US teachers spend up to $1.6 bn in school supply each year. Since 2014, Yoobi helped over 83,000 class-
rooms. Source: Yoobi’s social impact report https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0445/6817/files/
Yoobi_IR_2016-17.pdf?5399011371574081631.
30Source: https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/
sustainability/group-reports/bp-sustainability-report-2018.pdf
31For instance, several US and European states have recently introduced of a new legal corporate form
designed for for-profit entities also wishing to serve a broader social purpose, called “benefit corporations”
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9 Conclusions
What is the broader purpose of firms? This paper investigates firms’ objectives by fo-
cusing on socially responsible firms. I start my analysis from the observation that too
large prosocial investments decrease a firm’s profit, which could raise social impact as an
objective of the firm. To grasp a firm’s objective, I propose a novel theoretical approach
based on comparing a firm’s socially responsible investment with its profit-maximizing
benchmark. In the empirical analysis, I employ data from an online for-profit firm offer-
ing auctions of celebrities’ belongings for charity. The firm purchases items from celebri-
ties and charities and agrees to donate a fraction of the auction price back to the charity.
This dataset comes with several advantages. First, social responsibility corresponds to
the donation, and thus it is easy to quantify and very salient to consumers. Second, the
procurement costs of each item can be inferred from the reserve price.
The results from a structural model of demand and supply indicate that donations are
profitable. Yet, the profitability is mainly due to cost-reductions rather than the charity
premiums. On the one hand, the firm can procure items at lower prices when it donates
more, but on the other hand, the increase in consumers’ willingness to pay does not offset
the decrease in net revenues due to the donations. Thus, even when social responsibility
is easily noticed by consumers, demand may not provide enough incentives for firms to
behave prosocially. Comparing marginal revenues and marginal costs, I find that the firm
donates well beyond what it should donate to maximize profits. To explain this result, I
provide additional empirical evidence pointing to donations to charities as an additional
objective of the firm. My results shed light on the working of benefit corporations – a
growing set of social impact firms including Patagonia as well as many subsidiaries of
Danone – and open questions on the conduct of firms in terms of pricing and competition
when firms are not profit-maximizing entities.
(Hiller, 2013). This legal status shelters the managers of socially responsible firms in case of poor financial
performances: shareholders who wish to overthrow the managerial board must also prove that the firm
failed to achieve the desired social output.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean St.Dev. Q(25%) Q(50%) Q(75%) Q(95%)
Auction characteristics
Fraction donated (q) 0.70 0.27 0.78 0.85 0.85 0.85
Transaction price in e 364.25 187.50 222.00 315.00 452.50 760.00
Reserve price in e 179.03 132.02 100.00 145.00 210.00 500
Minimum increment in e 1.71 3.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.68
Number of bidders 7.83 3.27 5.00 7.00 10.00 14
Number of bids placed 24.97 18.36 11.00 20.00 34.00 62
Sold at reserve price (b) 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Length (days) 8.08 3.07 7.00 7.00 7.00 14.00
Extended time (b) 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Charity’s activity
Helping disables individuals (b) 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Infrustructures in developing countries (b) 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Healthcare (b) 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Humanitarian scopes in developing countries (b) 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Children’s wellbeing (b) 0.84 0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Neurodegenerative disorders (b) 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Charity belongs to the soccer team (b) 0.10 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Improving access to sport (d) 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: Overview of the main covariates used in all specifications in the reduced form analysis and in the structural model. A (b)
singals that the variable is binary (0/1). Prices are in Euro. If the listing is in GBP the final price is converted in euro using the
exchange rate of the last day of auction.
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Table 2: Relation between log(Price) and percentage donated
Transaction Price (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Fraction Donated (q) 87.147∗∗∗ 84.083∗∗∗ 85.604∗∗∗ 94.227∗∗∗
(15.261) (15.555) (16.534) (17.226)
Reserve Price 0.823∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.041)
Number of Bidders 4.966∗∗∗ 5.081∗∗∗ 4.476∗∗∗ 4.127∗∗
(1.705) (1.717) (1.710) (1.719)
Main Variables Y Y Y Y
Add. Charity Dummies Y Y Y
League/Match Dummies Y Y
Time Dummies Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.567 0.568 0.581 0.592
BIC 14,049 14,065 14,135 14,211
N 1,109 1,108 1,108 1,108
Note: OLS regression of log of the transaction price on covariates. Control variables are defined in Ap-
pendix B. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
Table 3: Relation between the rate of daily bidders and percentage donated
Number of Daily Bidders (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Fraction Donated (q) 0.032 0.050 –0.000 0.029
(0.055) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058)
Main Variables Y Y Y Y
Add. Charity Dummies Y Y Y
League/Match Dummies Y Y
Time Dummies Y
Pseudo R-squared 0.125 0.127 0.139 0.151
N 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108
Note: Poisson regression of the number of bidders on covariates. The length of the auction is used as
exposure variable. Control variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Estimated altruistic demand parameters
Number of bidders α β
Quantile n [95% CI] [95% CI]
99% 16 17.4% 42.7%
[7.6%, 26.8%] [23.2% 57.7%]
95% 14 17.2% 42.7%
[7.5%, 25.2%] [18.7% 56.1%]
90% 12 16.9% 42.7%
[7.3%, 25.5%] [20.7% 57.6%]
75% 10 16.5% 42.6%
[6.8%, 25.7%] [21.4% 60.3%]
50% 7 15.5% 42.4%
[6.0%, 23.5%] [19.8% 57.5%]
Note: The table displays results from the structural estimation of α and β for selected quantiles of the
distribution of the number of bidders. The preference parameters α and β represent the additional utility
due to somebody else’s donations or due to the bidder’s own donation, respectively. Refer to equation
4.1 in Section 4 for more information. The 95% confidence intervals are reported in square brackets. The
CI are found by bootstrap with replacement (401 times). Dataset restricted to all auctions such that q ∈
{10%,85%}. 730 observations in total.
Table 5: Evidence of bargaining
Fraction Donated (q) (I) (II) (III) (IV)
August 0.070∗∗ 0.074∗∗
(0.029) (0.030)
July & August 0.077∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.024)
Main Variables Y Y Y Y
Add. Charity Dummies Y Y
League/Match Dummies Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.311 0.354 0.316 0.357
N 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109
Note: The table displays estimates from OLS regressions of the fraction donated on covariates. The top
panel shows the coefficients of the dummy variables August (1 if the month is August, 0 otherwise) and July
and August (1 if the month is either July or August, 0 otherwise) as in equation (7.1) Control variables are
defined in Appendix B. Control variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Cost estimation
(I) (II)
Quadratic Cost Cubic Cost
pi0 (constant term) 236.60∗∗∗ 250.26∗∗∗
(15.18) (94.31)
pi1 (linear term) -428.99∗∗∗ -596.09
(82.58) (1101.82)
pi2 (quadratic term) 211.92∗∗∗ 578.10
(81.22) (2326.45)
pi3 (cubic term) -222.24
(1365.89)
Adjusted R-squared 0.591 0.582
BIC 11,926 11,973
N 1,108 1,108
Note: The table displays estimates from OLS regressions of the recovered procurement cost on a quadratic
(Column I) and a cubic (Column II) polynomial expansion of q. pi0 is the intercept, while pi1,pi2 and pi3
refers to the linear (q), quadratic (q2) and cubic term (q3). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
Figure 1: Number of auctions by percentage donated
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Note: The barplot displays the number of auctions available in the dataset by percentage donated. The plot
includes only auctions of items for a price in (e 100, e 1,000) with reserve price was greater than 0, at least
two bidders and minimum increment not greater than e 25. There are 1,189 auctions in total. Charitystars
generally withholds at least 15% of the final price and therefore all auctions whose percentage donated is
above 85% are excluded from the following analysis as these are special one-off charitable events (black
columns).
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Figure 2: The impact of a change in q on bids and revenues
(a) Derivative of the bid with respect to α
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(b) The revenue maximizing donation (qR)
revenue maximizing q
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Note: Panel a. The figure reports the analytical derivative of the bid function (4.2) w.r.t. q. q = 85% and
F(·) is a truncated normal in [0,100] with mean 50 and standard deviation σ. Panel b. The figure shows the
optimal percentage donated (qR) obtained at the intersection of the elasticity of the expected winning bid
with respect to q and the curve q/(1− q). Values of the elasticity and q/(1− q) (solid and dotted curves) are
on the left vertical axis. The right axis shows the net revenues (dashed curve) (or second-highest bid times
(1− q)): (1− q)∫v b(v)dF(2)(n)(v)). The distribution of values F(v) is uniform on [0,100], α = 0.5, β = 0.7 and
there are two bidders.
Figure 3: Out-of-sample validation
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Note: The plot compares the density of the private values estimated from the structural model employing
data from auctions with q = {10%,85%} and the density of the private values obtained projecting the three-
step estimation procedure on the q = 78% auctions. The null hypothesis (equality) cannot be rejected at
standard level (p-value: 0.1874). The estimations assume n = 16, a Gaussian kernel and Silverman’s rule-
of-thumb bandwidth (Silverman, 1986). The density f (v) is approximated using a cubic spline.
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Figure 4: Charity premium
(a) Gross revenues and charity markup
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(b) Net revenues and elasticity of demand
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Note: Panel a. The plot displays the expected gross revenues to Charitystars at the estimated primitives
(solid line), the revenues from a similar second-price non-charity auction (dotted line), and the charity
markup (dashed line, right axis). Panel b. The plot displays the expected net revenues (dashed line, right
axis), the elasticity of the winning bid (solid line, left axis) and the ratio q/(1− q) (dotted line, left axis)
for varying levels of q. The density f (v) and the distribution F(v) are approximated using a cubic spline.
Revenues assume that the number of potential bidders is 16 in both plots.
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Figure 5: Optimal donation
(a) Optimal fraction donated
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(b) Optimal profits
median donation
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Note: Panel a. The plot displays the optimal fraction donated as the intersection of marginal costs (dotted
and dashed lines) and net benefits (solid line). The marginal costs are estimated using quadratic polynomi-
als (dotted line) and cubic polynomials (dashed line). Panel b. The plot displays how profits change with
the fraction donated (q). The vertical line at 85% indicate the median donation by Charitystars. The density
f (v) and the distribution F(v) are approximated using a cubic spline. Profits are computed as net revenues
minus costs as in the quadratic polynomials case. Marginal revenues and revenues assume that the number
of potential bidders is 16 in both plots.
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Online Appendix
A Theoretical Appendix
A.1 Lemma A1
The following lemmas show conditions for b(v) = v when α ≥ β and b(v) = v/(1− qβ) when
α < β. These results are necessary to prove Lemma 1.
Lemma A1. Assume that α ≥ β. The bid function b(v) crosses the 45◦ line only once if b(v) ≥ v, and
either never or two times if b(v) < v.
Proof: First, I focus on the case b(v) ≥ v. The bid function evaluated at the upper bound, b(v) =
v
1+qα−qβ implies that b(v) < v.
1 Thus, given the requirement that b(v) < v, one need to show that
there exists only one vˆ such that b(vˆ) ≤ vˆ ∀v ∈ [v, vˆ] and b(vˆ) < vˆ, then b(v) < v ∀v ∈ (vˆ,v] .
The following condition holds at b(v) = v
(α− β)q = 1
v
∫ v
v
(1− F(x)
1− F(v)
) 1−qβ
qα +1
dx,
which is obtained substituting b(v) = v in the left-hand side of (4.2). Multiplying both sides of the
equation by (1/qα) · f (v)/[1− F(v)] gives
1
qα
f (v)
1− F(v) (α− β)q =
1
v
∂b(v)
∂v
, (A.1)
where the right-hand side includes the derivative of the bidding function w.r.t. v, which is positive
because
∂b∗(v;α,β,q)
∂v
=
 1qα
∫ v
v
(
1−F(x)
1−F(v)
) 1−q·β
q·α +1
dx f (v)1−F(v) > 0, if α > 0∧ q > 0
1
1−qβ > 0, if α = 0∨ q = 0.
(A.2)
Assume that there are three values v1 < v2 < v3 such that the bid computed at each value is
equal to the value itself. Given that b(v) is differentiable and b(v) , v for v < {v1,v2,v3}, it must
be that b(v) < v for v ∈ (v1,v2) and v ∈ (v3,v] and b(v) > v for v ∈ (v,v1) and v ∈ (v2,v3). The
increasing hazard rate property gives
1
qα
f (v2)
1− F(v2) (α− β)q >
1
qα
f (v1)
1− F(v1) (α− β)q
1
qα
f (v3)
1− F(v3) (α− β)q >
1
qα
f (v2)
1− F(v2) (α− β)q.
1This result is obtained by applying L’Hospital’s rule to
∫ v
v∗
(
1−F(x)
1−F(v∗)
) 1−qβ
qα +1 dx and the increasing hazard
rate assumption.
1
Because (A.1) must hold at v1,v2 and v3,
∂b(v2)
∂v2
∂b(v1)
∂v1
>
v2
v1
> 1,
∂b(v3)
∂v3
∂b(v2)
∂v2
>
v3
v2
> 1,
a contradiction. In fact, while the ratio of the derivative at v2 and v1 must be larger than 1, as
the curve intersects the 45◦ line from below the line, this cannot happen at v3 and v2, because the
intersection happens from above the line. The bid function crosses the 45◦ line at v2 from below,
while it crosses the same line from above at v3, implying
∂b(v3)
∂v3
<
∂b(v2)
∂v2
.
Figure A1b provides a graphical representation. Because v1,v2 and v3 are arbitrary values, the
proof holds for all v. Given that b(v) ≥ v, b(v) < v and because b(v) cannot cross the 45◦ line more
than twice without violating the increasing hazard rate property, it must be that b(v) = v at most
once.
The second case (b(v) < v) follows immediately from the previous derivation, given that b(v)
cannot cross the 45◦ line more than twice without violating the increasing hazard rate assumption.
This implies that b(v) = v for either two values v1 and v2 or no value at all. In this case, in order to
respect the increasing hazard rate property, the bid function meets the diagonal line from below
at the first cutoff and from above at the second cutoff, making a cutoff like v3 infeasible.

A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
If β ≥ α then ∂b(·;q)/∂q > 0. If α > β then ∃ v˜ ∈ [v,v] s.t. ∂b(·;q)/∂q < 0 ∀ v ∈ (v˜,v].
Proof: Assume q > 0 and let α˜ = q · α and β˜ = q · β. First we analyze the derivative of b(v) w.r.t. q
when α = 0, which is:
∂b∗(v;α = 0,β,q)
∂q
=
βv
(1− β˜)2 > 0.
The derivative in this case is always positive as β < 1 and q < 1, meaning that bids increase in q.
Turn now to the derivative with respect to q when α is positive. This proof has multiple steps.
(i) I establish that for β ≥ α > 0 the bid is increasing in q ∀v. (ii) I focus on the remaining case
(β < α) and show that the derivative of the bid w.r.t. q can have both positive and negative values.
(iii) I show that, at the value such that the derivative is zero (called v˜), if the bid is larger than the
value, then b(v) is always decreasing. (iv) In the final step, I show conditions for the uniqueness
of v˜.
Step 1. Take derivative of (4.2) w.r.t. q for α > 0 is
∂b∗(v;α > 0,β,q)
∂q
=
∫ v
v
(
1−F(x)
1−F(v)
) 1+α˜−β˜
α˜
(
− α(1+α˜−β˜)
α˜2
log 1−F(x)1−F(v) − (α− β)
)
dx− (α− β)v
(1+ α˜− β˜)2 . (A.3)
An application of the L’Hospital’s Rule shows that the integral is continuous and finite everywhere
with respect to x. Inspection of this equation reveals that is positive if β ≥ α (these refers to warm
glow or pure altruism models). Therefore, bids are increasing in q if β > α for all v.
2
Step 2. Turn to the remaining case (0 < α < β or shill bidders model). (A.3) crosses the x-axis at v˜.
By rewriting (A.3), at v˜
−
∫ v
v
(
1− F(x)
1− F(v)
) 1+α˜−β˜
α˜ α(1+ α˜− β˜)
α˜2
log
1− F(x)
1− F(v)dx = (α− β)
v + ∫ v
v
(
1− F(x)
1− F(v)
) 1−β˜
α˜ +1
dx∣∣∣∣∣
v=v˜
= (α− β)(1+ α˜− β˜)b(v˜).
(A.4)
where the second line replaces the expression to the right-hand side with the optimal bid function
in (4.2). Thus, (A.3) can be positive or negative.
Step 3. This step shows that the derivative is decreasing at v˜ if b(v˜) ≥ v˜. Given that the right-hand
side of (A.4) is increasing in v everywhere, it will also be increasing in v at v˜. To show that there
is at most one v˜, it suffices to show that the left-hand side is a decreasing function of v, at v˜. The
derivative of the left-hand side w.r.t. v is
−
∫ v
v˜
(
1− F(x)
1− F(v˜)
) 1−β˜
α˜ +1
α
1+ α˜− β˜
α˜2
(
1+
1+ α˜− β˜
α˜
log
1− F(x)
1− F(v˜)
)
dx
f (v˜)
1− F(v˜) ,
(A.5)
while the derivative of the right-hand side can be rewritten as
(α− β)(1+ α˜− β˜)
α˜
(
b(v˜)(1+ α˜− β˜)− v˜) f (v˜)
1− F(v˜) . (A.6)
Putting together (A.5) and (A.6) and using (A.4) to rewrite (A.5) in terms of bids and values, (A.3)
is decreasing at v˜ if
− (b(v˜)(1+ α˜− β˜)− v˜)α1+ α˜− β˜
α˜2
+ (α− β) (1+ α˜− β˜)
2
α˜
b(v˜) ≤ (α− β)(1+ α˜− β˜)
α˜
(
b(v˜)(1+ α˜− β˜)− v˜)
⇒ α1+ α˜− β˜
α˜2
b(v˜) ≥ α
α˜2
v˜ +
α− β
α˜
v˜ = α
1+ α˜− β˜
α˜2
v˜
⇒ b(v˜) ≥ v˜.
where
∫ v
v˜
(
1−F(x)
1−F(v˜)
) 1+α˜−β˜
α˜
dx is rewritten in terms of bid minus values. This means that (A.3) is
positive at the left of v˜ and negative to the right of v˜. Therefore, as long as the equilibrium bid
at the cut-off value v˜ is greater than the cut-off itself, bids will be decreasing in q for all v > v˜, if
α > β.
Step 4 When α > β, the limit of (A.3) for v→ v is negative. In fact, under the increasing hazard
rate condition (Assumption 1.3) applying L’Hospital’s rule to the first term (in the numerator) of
(A.3) yields
lim
v→v
∫ v
v (1− F(x))
1+α˜−β˜
α˜
(
− α(1+α˜−β˜)
α˜2
log 1−F(x)1−F(v) − (α− β)
)
dx
(1+ α˜− β˜)2 (1− F(v)) 1+α˜−β˜α˜
= 0,
while the limit of the remaining part is limv→v−(α− β)v = −(α− β)v < 0.
There are two cases: in Case 1 v˜ is unique and in Case 2 either v˜ does not exist or there are two
v˜.
Case 1. The first case assumes b(v) ≥ v. To show that v˜ is unique I merge two results: (i) the
3
limit of (A.3) is negative at the upper bound of the support of v, and (ii) there is no region on the
support of v such that b(v) < v inside and b(v) > v to its left and right. Therefore, it cannot switch
sign from negative to positive and back to negative again, implying that if v˜ exists, it is unique.
Recall from Lemma A1 that when b(v) ≥ v, b(v) intersects the 45◦ line only once, at ˜˜v, such
that b(v) > v for v < ˜˜v and b(v) < v for v > ˜˜v. The result in step 3 coupled with the requirements
(i) that (A.3) is negative when evaluated at the upper bound, (ii) that (A.3) is continuous on the
support of v, and (iii) Lemma A1, necessarily means that (A.3) cannot switch sign more than once,
imply that v˜ < ˜˜v as otherwise ∂b(v)/∂q|v=v > 0. In fact, for v˜ ≥ ˜˜v (A.3) is increasing at v˜, which
implies that (A.3) is positive for v > v˜. Then, (A.3) must switch sign again to negative in order to
satisfy the ∂b(v)/∂q|v=v < 0 condition, but this is not possible in this region because of ˜˜v is unique
and b(v) < v for v > v˜ ≥ ˜˜v. (see Figure A1a).
In addition, the uniqueness of ˜˜v implies that v˜ does not exists if (A.3) is negative at v. In this
case, the derivative of the bid w.r.t q will always be negative. Therefore, if v˜ exists, it is unique and
separates those who increase their bid (low value bidders) from those who decrease it (high-value
bidders).
Case 2. The second case assumes b(v) < v. Lemma A1 proves that there are either no ˜˜v or that
there are exactly two ˜˜v so that the bid function cuts the 45◦ line twice. It follows that there exist
either no cutoff or exactly two v˜ = {v˜1, v˜2} such that (A.4) is increasing at v˜1 and decreasing at
v˜2, with v˜1 < v˜2 because the limit of (A.3) is negative at the upper bound. In fact, it must be that
b(v˜1) < v˜1 and b(v˜2) > v˜2.
Hence, when α > β there exists a value v˜ such that (at least some) bidders with values below
v˜ increase their bids, while all bidders with values above v˜ decrease it after a marginal increase in
q. When instead α ≤ β all bidders increase their bids after a marginal increase in q. 
Figure A1: Illustration of the proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma A1
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Note: Panel (a) shows the effect of a marginal increase in q when α > β assuming that b(v) > v. The
complementary case would show two v˜, such that the derivative (dotted line) is negative for the lowest
value bidders, positive for the bidders with values between v˜1 and v˜2 and negative for the highest value
bidders. The plot for the proof of Lemma ?? would be similar to Panel (a) with the exception that the 45◦
line is replaced by the v/(1− qβ) line. Panel (b) shows that the bid is steeper at v2 than at v3. Lemma A1
states that if b(v) oscillates around the 45◦ line it violates the increasing hazard rate assumption.
4
A.3 Proof of Proposition A1
Proposition A1. When α = 0, the expected consumer surplus in a charity auction is equal to the consumer
surplus in a non-charity auction. The consumer surplus in a charity auction is greater that in a non-charity
auction when α > 0.
Proof: In a second-price non-charity auction a bidder’s dominant strategy is to bid her private
value (i.e. bNC(x) = x). The ex-ante consumer surplus is therefore:
CSNC =
∫ v
v
∫ v
v
v− bNC(x)dF(x)n−1dF(v)
=
∫ v
v
v · (1− F(v)n−1) +
∫ v
v
F(x)n−1dx dF(v),
(A.7)
where the second equality is derived integrating by parts. Showing that CSNC is identical to the
consumer surplus in an analogous charity auction where bidders do not gain from externalities
(i.e., α = 0) is trivial because the expected payment in the former is equal to the expected payment
minus warm glow of donating in the latter.2
For the consumer surplus of a charitable second-price auction when α > 0,
CSC =
∫ v
v
∫ v
v
v− (1− βq) · bC(x)dF(x)n−1dF(v)
+ qα · bC(v)F(v)n−2
(
1− F(v)
)
+ qα ·
∫ v
v
bC(x)dF(2)
(n−1)(x),
(A.8)
where bC(x) is defined as in (4.2) and F(2)
(n−1)(x) = F(x)
n−1 + (n− 1)F(x)n−2(1− F(x)). Plugging-
in the bidding function in (A.8), and after some algebra, one obtains:
CSC =
∫ v
v
{
v · (1− F(v)n−1) +
∫ v
v
F(x)n−1dx
−
∫ v
v
(1− F(x)
1− F(v)
) 1−qβ+qα
qα
dxF(v)n−1 − 1− qβ
1− qβ+ qα
∫ v
v
(1− F(x)
1− F(v)
) 1−qβ+qα
qα
F(x)n−1dx
+
qα
1− qβ+ qα
[
v +
∫ v
v
(1− F(2)
(n−1)(x))dx +
∫ v
v
(1− F(x)
1− F(v)
) 1−qβ+qα
qα
F(2)
(n−1)(x)dx−
∫ v
v
F(x)n−1dx
]}
dF(v).
(A.9)
Importantly, the first line in this equation is CSNC in (A.7). Therefore, in order to prove the theorem
I only need to show that the remaining two lines are positive.
In order to simplify the computations, approximate CSC with ĈSC where the expression in
the second line −∫ vv ( 1−F(x)1−F(v)) 1−qβ+qαqα dxF(v)n−1 is substituted with −∫ vv ( 1−F(x)1−F(v)) 1−qβ+qαqα F(x)n−1dx
2That is, if the expected payment is x, then x = x1−βq (1− βq).
5
as follows
ĈSC = CSNC
+
∫ v
v
{
−
∫ v
v
(1− F(x)
1− F(v)
) 1−qβ+qα
qα
F(x)n−1dx− 1− qβ
1− qβ+ qα
∫ v
v
(1− F(x)
1− F(v)
) 1−qβ+qα
qα
F(x)n−1dx
+
qα
1− qβ+ qα
[
v +
∫ v
v
(1− F(2)
(n−1)(x))dx +
∫ v
v
(1− F(x)
1− F(v)
) 1−qβ+qα
qα
F(2)
(n−1)(x)dx−
∫ v
v
F(x)n−1dx
]}
dF(v).
(A.10)
Because F(x)n−1 > F(v)n−1 for x > v, the last expression is smaller than the former. Hence ĈSC
can be viewed as a lower bound for CSC. Therefore if ĈSC > CSNC then also CSC > CSNC. The
remainder of this proof heavily relies on L’Hospital’s rule and integration by parts to show that
this ordering holds. In particular I will show that the third line (which involves sums of positive
terms) is greater than the second line.
To save on notation, denote
(
1−F(x)
1−F(v)
)
by Φ and 1−qβ+qαqα by ψ. Integrating by part the first term
in the second line of (A.10) (i.e.,
∫ v
v −
∫ v
v Φ
ψF(x)n−1dxdF(v)) gives
−
[∫ v
v
ΦψF(x)n−1dxF(v)
∣∣∣∣∣
v
v
−
∫ v
v
−F(v)n +
∫ v
v
Φψ · ψ · f (v)
1− F(v)F(x)
n−1dxF(v)dv
]
. (A.11)
The first term in brackets is 0, while the second term (negative) and the third term (positive)
will be cancelled out using a combination of the second expression in the second line and the term
+ 1ψ
∫ v
v Φ
ψ[F(x)n−1 + (n− 1)F(x)n−2(1− F(x))]dx in the middle of the third line of (A.10). Starting
from the former, and integrating it by parts:
∫ v
v
− 1− qβ
1− qβ+ qα
∫ v
v
ΦψF(x)n−1dx dF(v) = −
[
1− qβ
1− qβ+ qα
∫ v
v
ΦψF(x)n−1dxF(v)
∣∣∣∣∣
v
v
−
∫ v
v
1− qβ
1− qβ+ qαF(v)
n +
∫ v
v
1− qβ
1− qβ+ qαΦ
ψ · ψ · f (v)
1− F(v)F(x)
n−1F(v)dx dv
]
.
(A.12)
The first term in the square brackets is zero because of the L’Hospital’s rule.3 In addition, the
second two terms in (A.11) and (A.12) are similar, with the only difference being the multiplicative
constant and the integration regions. However, because:∫ v
v
A(x)dx =
∫ v
v
A(x)dx−
∫ v
v
A(x)dx,
3In fact the limv→v
1−qβ
1−qβ+qα
∫ v
v Φ
ψF(x)n−1dx = 0, while the expression is also zero for v → v because
F(v) = 0.
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where A(x) is a continuous function. The last term in (A.12) can be rewritten as∫ v
v
∫ v
v
1− qβ
1− qβ+ qαΦ
ψ · ψ · f (v)
1− F(v)F(x)
n−1 dx F(v)dv =
=
∫ v
v
∫ v
v
1− qβ
1− qβ+ qαΦ
ψ · ψ · f (v)
1− F(v)F(x)
n−1 dx F(v)dv
−
∫ v
v
∫ v
v
1− qβ
1− qβ+ qαΦ
ψ · ψ · f (v)
1− F(v)F(x)
n−1 dx F(v)dv,
(A.13)
where the term in the second line is positive while the remaining term is negative. Given this
algebra, I can cancel out the last term in (A.11) by summing the last term in (A.13) with a similar
one but with 1/ψ as a multiplicative factor (i.e. 1/ψ+ (1− qβ)/(1− qβ+ qα) = 1). This term is
found by integrating by parts the term in the second line of (A.10) that was previously mentioned:∫ v
v
1
ψ
∫ v
v
Φψ[F(x)n−1 + (n− 1)F(x)n−2(1− F(x))]dx dF(v)
=
1
ψ
[∫ v
v
Φψ[F(v)n−1 + (n− 1)F(v)n−2(1− F(v))]dxF(v)
∣∣∣∣∣
v
v
−
∫ v
v
−[F(x)n + (n− 1)F(x)n−1(1− F(x))]dv
−
∫ v
v
∫ v
v
Φψ · ψ · f (v)
1− F(v) [F(x)
n−1 + (n− 1)F(x)n−2(1− F(x))]dx F(v)dv
]
.
(A.14)
Once again the first term in brackets goes to zero. Moreover, a portion of the last term (i.e.,
−∫ vv Φψ · ψ · f (v)1−F(v)F(x)n−1dxF(v)dv ) can be summed with the last term in (A.13) to cancel out
the last term in (A.11). Similarly, the second term in (A.11) cancels out with the sum of the second
term in (A.12) and a portion of the second term in (A.14) (i.e.,
∫ v
v F(x)
ndv).
To conclude the proof, the sum of the remaining terms in (A.14) and (A.10) must be positive.
To show that the remaining part of (A.14) is positive, rewrite it as:∫ v
v
(
(n− 1) · F(v)n−2(1− F(v))
−
∫ v
v
(1− F(x))ψ (n− 1)F(x)n−2(1− F(x))dx ψ (1− F(v))−ψ−1 f (v)
)
F(v)dv.
(A.15)
Integration by parts of the second line of (A.15) yields
−
[∫ v
v
(1− F(x))ψ (n− 1)F(x)n−2(1− F(x))F(v)dx · (1− F(v))−ψ
∣∣∣∣∣
v
v
+
∫ v
v
(n− 1) · F(v)n−2(1− F(v))F(v)dv
−
∫ v
v
∫ v
v
(1− F(x))ψ (n− 1)F(x)n−2(1− F(x)) f (v)dx (1− F(v))−ψ dv
]
.
(A.16)
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The first term evaluated at the limits of the support of v is zero.4 In addition, the term in the
second line of (A.16) is equal to the first term in (A.15) but with opposite signs so they cancel out,
while the last term is positive. Finally, the sum of the first and last term in the third line of (A.10)
is positive.
Therefore, ĈSC > CSNC implying also that CSC > CSNC. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Define η(pe,q) = ∂p
e
∂q
q
pe as the elasticity of the expected price, p
e, to the donation, q. When α = 0, the
auctioneer should not donate. When α > 0, the revenue maximizing donation solves η(pe(qR),qR) =
qR
1−qR .
Proof: Assume that the marginal cost is zero for simplicity. Then, the producer surplus is equal to
the net revenue to the auctioneer for each object sold:
PS(α,β,q) =

∫ v
v (1− q) · 11+q·(α−β)
{
v +
∫ v
v
(
1−F(x)
1−F(v)
) 1−q·β
q·α +1
dx
}
dF(2)
(n)(v), if α > 0 and q > 0∫ v
v (1− q) · v1−q·βdF(2)(n)(v), if α = 0 or q = 0.
When α = 0 the derivative of the producer surplus w.r.t. q is negative as β ∈ (0,1). Therefore, the
auctioneer is always better off by setting q = 0.
Consider the other case (α > 0). First suppose that q = 1: this cannot be optimal because it
would leave the auctioneer with zero profits. In this case, setting q = 0 would be a profitable
deviation, proving that q = 1 cannot be a solution for a profit maximizer auctioneer. To simplify
the notation, given α and β, denote the bid of a bidder with valuation v in an auction where q˜ is
donated by b(v, q˜). The expected net revenue in a second-price charity auction is∫ v
v
(1− q)b(v,q)dF(2)
(n)(v).
Let η be the elasticity of the expected price pe =
∫ v
v b(v,q)dF
(2)
(n)(v) with respect to a marginal
change in q: η = ∂ ln p
e
∂ lnq =
∂pe
∂q
q
pe . By the Dominated Convergence Theorem, I can interchange dif-
ferentiation and integration, so that the derivative of the expected price with respect to q can be
rewritten as ∂p
e
∂q =
∫ v
v
∂b(v,q)
∂q dF
(2)
(n)(v). Using the elasticity formula,
∫ v
v
∂b(v,q)
∂q dF
(2)
(n)(v) = η
pe
q .
The optimal franction donated is the q that solves the FOCs of the auctioneer’s problem (the
second-order conditions are satisfied):∫ v
v
−b(v,q) + (1− q)∂b(v,q)
∂q
dF(2)
(n)(v) = 0.
4This result follows from L’Hospital’s rule. In fact
lim
v→v
(1− F(v))ψ+1(n− 1)F(v)n−1
ψ(1− F(v))ψ−1 f (v) +
∫ v
v (1− F(x))ψ+1(n− 1)F(v)n−2dx f (v)
ψ(1− F(v))ψ−1 f (v) = 0.
The first term goes to zero, while to prove that the second term goes to zero as well I divide numerator and
denominator by f (v) and apply L’Hospital’s rule again.
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Substituting ηpe for the derivative of the bid, the optimal q is given by η = q1−q . 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, {F(v),α,β} are nonparametrically identified by observing two identical auc-
tions with different fractions donated.
Proof: Assume first that all bids are observed as in a second-price auction. To simplify the notation
I denote a bid only by b(v) and the bid distribution, density and hazard by G(b), g(b) and λG(b),
respectively. The researcher observes two types of auction, A and B, and that the only difference
among them is the fraction of the transaction price that will be donated, i.e. qA , qB. Because the
distribution of values F(·) is the same across auctions A and B, then for each value corresponding
to the τ-quantile of the value distribution, vx, the distribution of bids computed at that τ-quantile
must be equal, i.e. G(bx|qA) = G(bx|qB). Therefore, after rewriting the first order condition for
each set of auctions (??) as in (5.1) I can match the FOCs from the two auctions (??) based on the
quantiles of the bid distribution. This gives the following equation for each quantile of vx:
vAx − vBx = bAx − bBx + (α− β) · (qA · bAx − qB · bBx )− α · (qA · λG(bAx )− qB · λG(bBx )), (A.17)
where G(bx) = G(bAx ) = G(bBx ). Since vAx − vBx = 0, eq. A.17 can be rewritten in matrix notation as
∆(bx) = Bx ×
[
α− β
−α
]
, (A.18)
where ∆(bx) = −(bAx − bBx ) and Bx is the matrix [qAbAx − qBbBx ; qA · λG(bAx )− qB · λG(bBx )].
It can be shown that the matrix Bx has full rank (the two columns are linearly independent). To
prove this assume that Bx is not invertible and therefore that its columns are linearly dependent
(i.e. bx = k · λG(bx) for both auctions A and B). Dependence leads to G(bx) = 1− bx · g(bx)/k
for a constant k > 0. Note that k must be positive because otherwise (i) G(bx) > 1 as g(bx) ≥
0,∀bx and (ii) the FOC equation ξ(bx,α,β,q), which was defined in (5.1), may not be monotonically
increasing in bx. The previous differential equation admits a solution g(bx) = c · (bx)−(k+1), where
c is an integration constant. Thus, G(bx) = 1− c · (bx)−k/k. Evaluating the CDF at bx = 0 yields
G(0) = −∞, ∀k > 0. Moreover, the inverse hazard rate
λG(bx) =
1− 1+ c · (bx)−k/k
c · (bx)−(k+1)
=
bx
k
for k > 0,
is increasing in bx. This implies that
1− F(vx)
f (vx)
=
1− G(b(vx))
g(b(vx)) · b′(vx) =
1
k
b(vx)
b′(vx)
,
which is an increasing function because (i) the optimal bidding function b(v) is increasing in the
private value vx and (ii) the bidding function b(vx) maximizes a bidder’s utility (b′′(vx) ≤ 0). This
means that the inverse hazard rate is not decreasing and that therefore b(vx) is not a best response
for vx. This is a contradiction, which proves that the columns in Bx are not linearly dependent and
that Bx is invertible.5 Given that Bx has full rank, α,β and F(v) are nonparametrically identified.
5If k = 1, then g(bx) = 0 for bx < 0 and g(bx) > 0 for bx ≥ 0. Therefore g(·) is the Dirac delta func-
tion, which is not differentiable and does not admit a decreasing inverse hazard rate. In turn, given that
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To extend this result to Charitystars’s auctions, note that the distribution of the winning bid
(Gw(b)) is identified from the data. In equilibrium, the distribution of the winning bid is equal to
the distribution of the second-highest bid (Gw(b) = G2(n)(b)). Therefore, G(b) is found as the root
(in [0,1]) of Gw(b)− nG(b)n−1 + (n− 1)G(b)n.
Now, the FOCs (5.1) can be written for each α and β. Therefore, one can apply the same logic
shown above, and identify α,β and F(v). 
A.6 Proof of Corollary 1
Corollary 1. α,β and F(v) are also nonparametrically identified when the dataset includes more than 2
types of auctions.
Proof: To simplify the notation I denote a bid only by b(v) and the bid distribution, density and
hazard by G(b), g(b) and λG(b), respectively. Assume that q has dimension KC and that Kx quan-
tiles of the distribution of values are observed. The FOC (5.1) in matrix notation becomes
V
Kx × KC
= (α− β)× B
Kx × KC
× QC
KC × KC
+ B
Kx × KC
−α× Λ
Kx × KC
× QC
KC × KC
, (A.19)
where V is a matrix of dimension Kx × KC displaying the value vx for the x−quantile (row) in
auction of type C (column), and 0 otherwise. Similarly, QC is a diagonal matrix with entries equal
to the percentage donated qC and 0. The other matrices are defined as:
B =
b
1
0 b
2
0 . . . b
KC
0
...
...
. . .
...
b11 b
2
1 . . . b
KC
1
 , Λ =
λ
1
G(b
1
0) λ
2
G(b
2
0) . . . λ
KC
G (b
KC
0 )
...
...
. . .
...
λ1G(b
1
1) λ
C2
G (b
2
1) . . . λ
KC
G (b
KC
1 ),

where superscripts indicate that the franction donated is equal to qj for j ∈ [1,KC] and subscripts
indicate the x− quantiles of the distribution of values or bids.
There exists a projection M (with rank KC− 1) such that V×M = 0. Postmultiplying (A.19) by
M and moving terms, the following equation represents the FOC where the dependent variable is
a known object
−B×M = (α− β)× B×QC ×M− α×Λ×QC ×M.
After stacking the matrices in vectors, the last equation can be represented by the system of equa-
tions
y =
[
b l
]× [α− β−α
]
,
where y = vec(−B × M),b = vec(B × QC × M), l = vec(Λ × QC × M), and vec(·) indicates the
vectorization of the matrices in parentheses.
Nonparametric identification requires showing that b and l are not proportional to each other
(i.e., that B and Λ are linearly independent). Nonproportionality follows directly from the argu-
ment in the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A.5. Hence, b and l are not linearly dependent,
establishing identification of α, β and F(v). 
F(v) = G(b(v)), the non-differentiability of G(·) implies that also the distribution of values F(·) is not
differentiable, a contradiction.
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A.7 The Bargaining Problem
This section provides a micro foundation to the condition for the optimal q∗ in equation 7.2 in
Section 7. The surplus to the firm is the difference of the net revenues (1− q)p and the procurement
cost κ. For simplicity, κ does not vary with q. Item providers (i.e., charities and celebrities) care for
the amount that is ultimately donated. For simplicity they incur no cost in giving the item. The
bargaining weights are ω for the firm and 1−ω for the provider. In this bargaining framework, q
maximizes (
(1− q)pe − κ)ω · (qpe + κ)1−ω,
where pe denotes the expected highest price, and is a function of the distribution of values, the
charity parameters (i.e., α and β), the number of bidders and q. The first-order condition with
respect to q can be rearranged to obtain
− pe
(
(1−ω) ((1− q) pe − κ)
ωκ + q ((1− q) pe − κ)
)
=
1− q
q
ηpe − pe, (A.20)
where η is the elasticity of the expected price to a change in q. The right-hand side is the same as
in (7.2), while the left-hand side is a function of the primitives.
The left-hand side can be interpreted as the marginal cost of the monopolist problem as in
Section 7 (c′(q)). When ω = 1, all bargaining power is in the hand of Charitystars, the left-hand
side becomes 0, and the optimal q∗ solves η = q1−q , as in the revenue maximization case (see
Proposition 1). Because there is no bargaining, setting a greater q does not yield any cost savings
(i.e., c′(q) = 0). Since Charitystars sets the reserve price to break even, the fraction in parenthesis
on the left-hand side is always positive (i.e., (1− q)pe > κ). Therefore when 0 ≤ ω < 1, the left-
hand side is negative, implying negative marginal costs in the model in Section 7.
Finally, the left-hand side in (A.20) can be rearranged by adding and subtracting 1/q in the
term in parentheses
−pe
(
− ω
q
κ + q ((1− q) pe − κ)
ωκ + q ((1− q) pe − κ) +
1
q
)
≈ − p
e
q
(1−ω),
which gives a clean interpretation of the marginal cost in terms of the bargaining weight and
primitives of the model.
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B Data Description
The data was collected using a Python script that searched a list of keywords across the pages
dedicated to soccer items on the company website, available at http://www.charitystars.com.
The script would gather all the available information regarding the auction, the charity, the listing
and the bid history. This information was augmented with data from other sources. For example,
a similar python script was used to recover footballers’ quality scores from a renowned videogame
(FIFA). Information on each charity’s mission was obtained from both Charitystars as well as each
charity’s website.
The analysis considers only a subset of the available auctions (see Section 2), according to the
following conditions: (i) transaction prices higher than the reserve price, (ii) reserve prices greater
than zero, (iii) two or more bidders, (iv) minimum increment is within e 25 and (v) maximum
donation of 85% of the final price.
B.1 Description of the Variables
The regressions in Section 2 and in the Appendix display only some of the actual variables used
in the analyses due to space limitations. These variables were distinguished in four groups based
on their relevance.
1. Main Variables: these are the variables used in all regression tables and in the structural
model. They are listed in Table C1 and their meaning is described by their label. Some
variables whose meaning is not immediately clear are described in the following list:
• The variable Length counts the number of days between the first bid and the closing
date (the listing date of the auction is unknown).
• The dummy Extended time is 1 if two or more bidders placed a bid in the last minutes
of the auction. In this case the time is extended until all but 1 bidders drop out
• Auctions within 3 weeks (same team) counts the number of auctions listing jerseys of the
same team as the one of the auctioned item. It only includes auctions within a 3 week
window from the end of the auction. It considers all auctions not only those with final
price larger than e 100 and smaller than e 1000.
• Auctions up to 2 weeks ago (same player/team) counts the number of auctions for a jersey
worn by the same player playing with the same team in the same year as the match
of the jersey that is auctioned. It considers all the listings up to 2 weeks from the end
of the auction (Charitystars’s auctions last between 1 and 2 weeks). It considers all
auctions not only those with final price larger than e 100 and smaller than e 1000.
• Count auctions same charity is a progressive count of the number of listings for each
charity.
• The dummy Player belongs to FIFA 100 list is 1 if the player is in the FIFA 100 list (the
list of the best soccer players ever).
• The variable Number of goals scored is equal to the number of goals scored by the player
with the auctioned jersey in a particular match if this number is mentioned in the
content of the listing. It is zero otherwise.
• The dummy Player belongs to an important team is 1 if the player plays for one of the fol-
lowing teams (alphabetic order): AC Milan, Argentina, Arsenal FC, AS Roma, Atletico
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de Madrid, Barcelona FC, Bayern Munich, Belgium, Borussia Dortmund, Brazil, Chelsea
FC, Colombia, England, FC Internazionale, France, Germany, Italia, Juventus FC, Liv-
erpool FC, Manchester City, Manchester United, Netherlands, PSG, Real Madrid, Sevilla
FC, Spain, SS Lazio, SSC Napoli, Uruguay. 6
2. Add. Charity Dummies: this group includes dummies for heterogeneity across charities based
on the mission of each charity. These dummies are not exclusive bins as most charities do
more than only one activity. There are 101 different charities in total. The dummy variables
used
• Helping disables individuals for charities involved in assistance to disable subjects.
• Infrustructures in developing countries for charities building infrastructures in develop-
ing countries.
• Healthcare for charities dealing with healthcare and health research.
• Humanitarian scopes in developing countries for charities helping people in situation of
poverty and undernourishment.
• Children’s wellbeing for charities providing activities (e.g., education and sport) to the
youth.
• Neurodegenerative disorders for charities helping those suffering from neurodegenera-
tive disorders.
• Charity belongs to the soccer team are charities linked to a football team.
• Improving access to sport charities give opportunity of integration through sport activi-
ties.
• Italian charity.
• English charity.
3. League/Match Dummies: these are dummies for soccer league and match heterogeneity. They
include:
• Dummies for each major competition (Champions League, Europa League, Serie A, Italian
Cup, Premier League, La Liga, Copa del Rey, European Supercup, Italian Supercup, Spanish
Supercup, UEFA European Championship, Qualifications to UEFA European Championship,
World Cup, Qualification to the World Cup7).
• Dummies weather the listings mentions that the match was won (Won) and for unoffi-
cial/replica jerseys which are not worn but only signed (Unofficial). There are only 79
jerseys in the dataset that are replica, and they are all signed by the player.
4. Time Dummies: this group include Month dummies (12 variables) and Year dummies (2 vari-
ables).
6In unreported analysis player quality was accounted also using the players’ evaluation from the
videogame FIFA. These variables do not affect prices significantly and are dropped.
7All remaining competitions are treated as friendly matches.
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Table C1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean St.Dev. Q(25%) Q(50%) Q(75%)
Auction characteristics
Percentage donated (q) 0.70 0.27 0.78 0.85 0.85
Transaction price in e 364.25 187.50 222.00 315.00 452.50
Reserve price in e 179.03 132.02 100.00 145.00 210.00
Minimum increment in e 1.71 3.15 1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of bidders 7.83 3.27 5.00 7.00 10.00
Number of bids placed 24.97 18.36 11.00 20.00 34.00
Sold at reserve price (b) 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
Length (in # days) 8.08 3.07 7.00 7.00 7.00
Extended time (b) 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Web-listing details
Length of description (in # words) 141.89 42.11 123.00 140.00 161.25
Content in English (b) 0.30 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
Content in Spanish (b) 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
Length of charity description (in # words) 123.47 56.62 107.00 107.00 120.00
Number of pictures 5.67 1.98 5.00 6.00 7.00
Auctions within 3 weeks (same team) 1.46 4.08 0.00 0.00 1.00
Auctions up to 2 weeks ago (same player/team) 5.06 7.92 0.00 1.00 7.00
Count auctions same charity 128.35 151.94 14.00 54.00 216.50
Player and match characteristics
Player belongs to FIFA 100 list (b) 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unwashed jersey (b) 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
Jersey is signed (b) 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Jersey is signed by the team players/coach (b) 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
Jersey worn during a final (b) 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of goals scored 0.03 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
Player belongs to an important team (b) 0.88 0.32 1.00 1.00 1.00
Charity provenience
Charity is Italian (b) 0.90 0.29 1.00 1.00 1.00
Charity is English (b) 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
Charity’s activity
Helping disables individuals (b) 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
Infrustructures in developing countries (b) 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
Healthcare (b) 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00
Humanitarian scopes in developing countries (b) 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00
Children’s wellbeing (b) 0.84 0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00
Neurodegenerative disorders (b) 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00
Charity belongs to the soccer team (b) 0.10 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
Improving access to sport (b) 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00
Note: Overview of the main covariates used in all specifications in the reduced form analysis and in the structural model.
A (b) singals that the variable is binary (0/1). Prices are in Euro. If the listing is in GBP the final price is converted in euro
using the exchange rate of the last day of auction
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C Additional Tables
Table D1: Linearity of the relation between log(Price) and percentage donated
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
log(Price) OLS Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)
Fraction Donated (q) 0.212∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.054) (0.089) (0.079)
F-test with OLS coefficient (p-value) 0.762 0.299 0.124
Main Variables Y Y Y Y
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared 0.502 0.353 0.326 0.315
N 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108
Note: The table displays estimates from OLS and quantile regressions of the logarithm of the transaction
price on covariates. The null hypothesis that the coefficient of the fraction donated (q) is the same in column
(II), (III) and (IV) is not rejected at 0.429 levels (F-test = 0.85). The last three columns report Pseudo R-
squared in place of Adjusted R-squared. The coefficients of the quantile regressions are plotted in Appendix
Figure E3. Control variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
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Table D2: OLS and IV regressions for the transaction price.
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Transaction Price OLS IV IV IV
Fraction Donated (q) 90.687∗∗∗ 141.796∗ 146.408∗ 182.071∗
(17.068) (84.163) (88.907) (96.339)
Reserve Price 0.770∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.181) (0.184) (0.193)
Bidders 12.793∗∗∗ 13.319∗∗∗ 13.341∗∗∗ 12.256∗∗∗
(1.480) (1.540) (1.597) (1.617)
First-stage F-stat 11.725 11.003 10.521
Weak-instrument p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001
Over-id p-value 0.847 0.817 0.145
Main Variables Y Y Y Y
Charity Dummies Y Y Y
League/Match Dummies Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.537 0.516 0.516 0.456
N 1,109 1,107 1,106 1,106
Note: The table displays estimates from OLS and IV regressions of the transaction price on covariates. The
reserve price and the fraction donated are instrumented using the average reserve price and average frac-
tion donated across all concurrent auctions (for each auction I take the average across all other auctions
ending in the previous and successive five days to the end of the auction). The middle panel reports the
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic for the first-stage test and the Anderson-Rubin Wald test for the weak-
instrument test. The overidentification test (Sargan test) is conducted using the mean number of bidders
across concurrent auctions as an additional instrument. The Hausman test does not reject the null hypoth-
esis of exogeneity of the reserve price and q at common values. League/Match Dummies are partialled out
in Column (IV). Control variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
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Table D3: OLS and IV regressions for the number of daily bidders.
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Number of Daily Bidder OLS IV IV IV
Fraction Donated (q) 0.077 0.056 0.122 0.061
(0.054) (0.253) (0.269) (0.279)
First-stage F-stat 41.780 36.232 31.648
Montiel-Pflueger robust p-value ≤0.05 ≤0.1 ≤0.1
Over-id p-value 0.473 0.499 0.431
Main Variables Y Y Y Y
Charity Dummies Y Y Y
League/Match Dummies Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.296 0.269 0.270 0.296
N 1,109 1,107 1,106 1,106
Note: The table displays estimates from OLS and IV regressions of the number of daily bidders (ratio of the
Number of Bidders and Number of Days) on covariates. The fraction donated is instrumented using the
average fraction donated across all concurrent auctions (for each auction I take the average across all other
auctions ending in the previous and successive five days to the end of the auction). The table reports the
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic for the first-stage test and the Montiel-Pflueger robust weak instrument
test. The overidentification test (Sargan test) is conducted by adding the average of the reserve prices
across concurrent auctions as an extra instrument. The Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis
of exogeneity of the reserve price and q at common values. League/Match Dummies are partialled out
in Column(IV). Control variables are defined in Appendix B. The reserve price and auction length are not
included as covariates. Control variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
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Table D4: Evidence of bargaining: IV regressions
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Fraction Donated (q) (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV)
August 0.074∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.039)
July & August 0.068∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.034)
First-stage F-stat 10.480 9.613
Weak-instrument p-value 0.022 0.004
Over-id p-value 0.166 0.221
Main Variables Y Y Y Y
Add. Charity Dummies Y Y Y Y
League/Match Dummies Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.354 0.270 0.357 0.187
N 1,109 1,107 1,109 1,107
Note: The table displays estimates from OLS and IV regressions of the fraction donated on covariates. The
top panel shows the coefficients of the dummy variables August (1 if the month is August, 0 otherwise) and
July and August (1 if the month is either July or August, 0 otherwise) as in equation (7.1). The reserve price
and the number of bidders are instrumented using the average reserve price and the number of bidders
across all concurrent auctions (for each auction I take all the auctions ending in the previous and successive
five days to the end of the auction). The table reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic for the first-stage
test and the Anderson-Rubin Wald test for the weak-instrument test. The overidentification test (Sargan
test) is conducted using the mean number of pictures across concurrent auctions as an additional instru-
ment. League/Match Dummies are partialled out in Column (II) and (IV). Control variables are defined in
Appendix B. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
Table D5: Nationalities of the top bidders
Italian UK France OtherEU
North
Am China Asia
East
Asia
Rest
World Tot
Winner 561 74 41 119 62 130 35 28 59 1,109
50.67% 6.67% 3.70% 9.92% 5.59% 11.72% 3.16% 2.52% 5.32% –
Second 604 79 28 113 51 117 33 26 58 1,109
54.46% 7.12% 2.52% 10.20% 4.60% 10.55% 2.98% 2.34% 5.23% –
Total 1,165 153 69 232 113 247 68 54 117 –
Note: Nationalities of the top bidders by geographic area. “Rest of the World” includes also Unknown
nationalities (12 winners and highest losers in total).
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Table D6: Regression of Price on bidder nationality
Transaction Price (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Fraction Donated (q) 84.854∗∗∗ 85.274∗∗∗ 85.731∗∗∗ 85.533∗∗∗ 85.554∗∗∗ 84.798∗∗∗ 85.516∗∗∗
(16.535) (16.542) (16.502) (16.549) (16.609) (16.468) (16.532)
Win: Italy –6.489
(7.856)
Win: UK 12.719
(15.581)
Win: France –18.343
(17.575)
Win: European Union 1.092
(12.276)
Win: North America 24.844
(16.210)
Win: China 16.098
(13.007)
Win: Asia –19.164
(21.529)
Main Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Add. Charity Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
League/Match Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1109 1,109
BIC 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,151 14,152 14,153
Adjusted R-squared 0.581 0.581 0.581 0.580 0.581 0.581 0.581
Note: The table displays estimates from OLS and IV regressions of the transaction price on covariates
including dummies for the most common nationalities of the winning bidder. Control variables are defined
in Appendix B. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
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Table D7: Regression of Price on recurrent winners
Transaction Price (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Recurrent Winner 10.814 18.163 10.814 18.163
(7.681) (17.872) (7.681) (17.872)
Fraction Donated (q) 85.575∗∗∗ 89.904∗∗∗ 85.575∗∗∗ 89.904∗∗∗
(15.234) (17.690) (15.234) (17.690)
Recurrent Winner · Fraction Donated (q) –10.406 –10.406
(24.858) (24.858)
Main Variables Y Y Y Y
Marginal Effect 7.757 10.829
(11.504) (11.533)
Adjusted R-squared 0.567 0.567 0.567 0.567
N 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109
Note: The table displays estimates from OLS regressions of the transaction price on covariates including the
dummy variable Recurrent Winner, which is 1 if the winner of the auction won more than 3 auctions (the median
in the data). Recurrent Winner is interacted with the fraction donated in even columns. The table shows that
the marginal effect of Recurrent Winner is not significantly different from zero (odd columns). Control variables
are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
Table D8: Overview of the most common models of giving
Model Overview
Noncharity
(α = β = 0) Bidders do not pay a premium in charity auctions.
Pure altruism
(α = β > 0)
Bidders obtain extra utility from donating, and are
willing to pay a premium. They do not distinguish
across sources of donation.
Warm glow
(β > α > 0)
Bidders derive greater satisfaction from their own
donation (impure altruism).
See-and-be-seen
(β > α = 0)
Bidders derive utility only from their own donation.
Limiting case of warm glow (α = 0).
Volunteer shill
(α > β > 0) Bidders obtain greater utility from giving by others.
Note: The preference parameters α and β represent the additional utility due to somebody
else’s donations or due to the bidder’s own donation, respectively. Refer to equation 4.1 in
Section 4 for more information. Source: Leszczyc and Rothkopf (2010).
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Table D9: First step of the structural estimation
(I) (II)
log(Transaction Price) Coefficient S.E.
log(Rreserve Price) 0.371∗∗∗ (0.024)
Minimum Increment 0.019 (0.014)
Minimum Increment2 0.0001 (0.0004)
log(Number of Bidders) 0.036 (0.044)
Sold at Reserve Price −0.121∗∗ (0.049)
log(Number of Bids) 0.261∗∗∗ (0.028)
Length 0.052∗∗∗ (0.018)
Length2 −0.002∗∗∗ (0.001)
Extended Time −0.029 (0.030)
Length of Description 0.001∗∗ (0.0004)
Content in English −0.057 (0.037)
Content in Spanish −0.010 (0.138)
Length of Charity Description −0.0003 (0.0003)
Number of Pictures −0.029 (0.022)
Number of Pictures2 0.003 (0.002)
Auctions within 3 weeks 0.010∗∗ (0.004)
Auctions up to 2 weeks ago 0.009∗∗∗ (0.002)
Count Auctions Same Charity −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Player belongs to FIFA 100 list 0.110∗∗ (0.047)
Unwashed Jersey 0.207∗∗∗ (0.048)
Jersey is Signed 0.086∗∗ (0.037)
Jersey is signed by the team players/coach 0.061 (0.074)
Jersey Worn During a Final 0.338∗∗∗ (0.098)
Number of Goals Scored 0.186∗∗∗ (0.061)
Player Belongs to an Important Team 0.242∗∗∗ (0.046)
Charity is English 0.168 (0.132)
Charity is Italian 0.208 (0.134)
Helping Disables 0.088∗∗ (0.039)
Infrastructures in Developing Countries 0.153∗∗ (0.069)
Healthcare −0.146∗∗ (0.057)
Humanitarian Scopes in Developing Countries 0.094 (0.065)
Children’s Wellbeing 0.068 (0.064)
Neurodgenerative Disorders 0.041 (0.084)
Charity Belongs to the Soccer Team −0.185∗∗ (0.081)
Improving Access to Sport 0.010 (0.066)
Constant 2.225∗∗∗ (0.249)
Adjusted R-squared 0.522
F Statistic 23.708∗∗∗ (df = 35; 694)
N 730
Note:The table displays estimates from OLS regressions of the logarithm of the transaction price as in the
first step of the structural model. Control variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis in column (II).
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
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Table D10: Estimated altruistic demand parameters with instruments
Number of bidders α β
Quantile n [95% CI] [95% CI]
99% 16 17.3% 43.1%
[6.12%, 29.6%] [18.5% 63.4%]
95% 14 17.1% 43.0%
[8.1%, 30.6%] [21.9% 63.9%]
90% 12 16.8% 43.0%
[7.4%, 28.9%] [23.6% 60.7%]
75% 10 16.4% 42.9%
[7.3%, 28.5%] [22.2% 60.9%]
50% 7 15.4% 42.8%
[7.3%, 25.4%] [24.3% 60.3%]
Note: The table displays results from the structural estimation of α and β for selected quantiles of the
distribution of the number of bidders. The first step regression is replaced with a 2SLS regression, where
the reserve price is instrumented with the average reserve price and the average number of bids placed in
concurrent auctions (±5 days). The F-test is 33.269, and the overidentification test statistics (Sargan test)
has a p-value of 0.192. The preference parameters α and β represent the additional utility due to somebody
else’s donations or due to the bidder’s own donation, respectively. Refer to equation 4.1 in Section 4 for
more information. The 95% confidence intervals are reported in square brackets. The CI are found by
bootstrap with replacement (401 times). Dataset restricted to all auctions such that q ∈ {10%,85%}. 727
observations in total.
22
Table D11: The impact of the fraction donated on the number of bidders over time
Independent Variables
Lagged Avg. q Avg. q Avg. q Adj. N
Dep. Var. (week) (lag 1) (lag 2) R-sq.
Dependent variable: Average number of bidders (weekly)
Average num. bidders 0.289∗∗ 1.380 0.559 266
(0.866) (0.850)
Average num. bidders 0.282∗∗∗ 1.198 1.048 0.560 266
(0.055) (0.864) (0.759)
Average num. bidders 0.288∗∗∗ 1.306 1.136 –0.683 0.554 265
(0.055) (0.863) (0.771) (0.769)
Dependent variable: Median number of bidders (weekly)
Q(50%) num. bidders 0.346∗∗∗ 1.438 0.492 266
(0.062) (0.940)
Q(50%) num. bidders 0.342∗∗∗ 1.334 0.596 0.491 266
(0.061) (0.970) (0.861)
Q(50%) num. bidders 0.350∗∗∗ 1.497 0.729 –1.005 0.486 265
(0.062) (0.955) (0.865) (0.850)
Dependent variable: 8th decile of the number of bidders (weekly)
Q(80%) num. bidders 0.228∗∗∗ 1.045 0.520 266
(0.059) (1.154)
Q(80%) num. bidders 0.224∗∗∗ 0.721 1.761∗ 0.522 266
(0.059) (1.150) (1.045)
Q(80%) num. bidders 0.228∗∗∗ 0.652 1.712 0.268 0.514 265
(0.059) (1.172) (1.059) (1.111)
Note: The table displays estimates from OLS regressions of the weekly number of bidders. The dependent
variable varies across rows, while the independent variables vary across columns. The lagged dependent
variable is in column 1. Weekly observations. The data includes all auctions of actually worn soccer jerseys
between June 19th, 2013, and November 6th, 2018 (3,968 auctions, 267 weeks in total). All regressions include
a constant and month and year fixed effects. The qualitative results would not change using monthly data.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
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Table D12: The impact of the fraction donated on the number of auctions over time
(I) (II) (III)
Lagged number of auctions (weekly) 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Average q (weekly) –5.282 –5.183 –5.544
(5.609) (5.713) (5.854)
Average q lag 1 week –0.526 –0.816
(4.980) (5.181)
Average q lag 2 week 1.965
(4.960)
Adjusted R-squared 0.302 0.299 0.293
N 266 266 265
Note: The table displays estimates from OLS regressions of the weekly number of auctions. The data
includes all auctions of actually worn soccer jerseys between June 19th, 2013, and November 6th, 2018
(3,968 auctions, 267 weeks in total). All regressions include a constant and month and year fixed effects.
The qualitative results would not change using monthly data. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* – p < 0.1; ** – p < 0.05; *** – p < 0.01.
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D Additional Figures
Figure E1: The webpage of a listing at the time of data collection
Title
Charity
Pictures %	donated
Countdown
Current	price	
Info	reserve	price	
Auction	leader
Description
Note: Screenshot of a webpage of a running auction on Charitystars.com for an AC Milan jersey worn and
signed by the player Giacomo Bonaventura. The standing price is GBP 110: this bid was placed by an
Italian bidder with username “Supermanfra”. A total of five bids are placed at this point. Although at the
current highest bid the reserve price is not met, this can change by the end of the auction. The auction will
be active for other 3 days and 18 hours and will expire on June 7th at 7AM. 85% of the proceeds will be
donated to “Play for Change”.
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Figure E2: How the firm allocates the funds at the time of data collection
Note: Screenshot describing how the firm allocates the fraction donated at the time of scraping.
Figure E3: Plot of the coefficient for the fraction donated from a quantile regression
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Note: The plot displays coefficients from quantile regressions of the logarithm of the transaction price on
q and covariates as in the first column of Table D1 in the main text. The shaded regions is the confidence
interval. The dashed (dotted) line reports the coefficient of the OLS regression (5% confidence interval).
Appendix Table D1 shows the coefficients for each quartile. Only auctions with price between e 100 and
e 1000. Boostrapped standard errors with 400 repetitions.
26
Figure E4: Density of the homogenized transaction prices by returning winners vs non-
returning winners
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Note: The plot display the density of the pseudo-winning bids from the first-step of the structural model
distinguishing by returning winners. Returning winners (or collectors) are bidders who won at least 4
auctions (the median is 3). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null hypothesis that the two
densities are equal at 0.4097 level. The plot is obtained using only auctions with q ∈ {10%,85%}. The plot-
ted densities are computed using a Gaussian kernel and Silverman’s rule-of-thumb bandwidths (Silverman,
1986).
Figure E5: Comparison between the model implied prices and observed average prices
(a) Deviation from average price (%)
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Note: Panel a. The barplot displays the percentage difference between the observed price in the data and
the expected price implied by the model for different number of bidders. A positive number indicates that
the model overstates prices. Panel b. The barplot displays the number of auctions such that the number of
bidders joining the auction is equal to that indicated in the x axis.
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Figure E6: Additional robustness checks
(a) Overidentification Test
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Note: Panel a. The plot compares the estimated densities in the main text (Main, solid line) with the den-
sity computed on two subsets of the moment conditions. The subset “Above Median” (“Below Median”)
includes only the moment related to observations computed above (below or equal to) the median. The
different sets of moments seem to produce the same densities. The KS-test does not reject the null hypoth-
esis that the densities are equal at p < 0.01. Panel b. The plots displays the simulated bids computed at the
sixth, seventh and eigth deciles of the estimated value distribution assuming that the median value of the
covariates in the first step of the estimation procedure.
Figure E7: Overbidding with respect to private values
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Note: The plot compares the distribution of bids with the distribution of private values at the estimated
primitives. Distributions are simulated by drawing 200 private values from the estimated distribution of
values, and using the estimated α and β, with q = 1.
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Figure E8: Number of bidders and number of auctions over time
(a) Monthly median number of bidders over
time
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(b) Monthly number of auctions over time
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
N
um
be
r o
f A
uc
tio
ns
 (b
y M
on
th)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Months
Note: Panel a. The plot shows the median number of bidders by month. Panel b. The plot shows the
number of auctions by month. The data includes all auctions of actually worn soccer jerseys between June
19th, 2013, and November 6th, 2018 (3,968 auctions, 267 weeks in total).
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E Robustness Checks for the Optimal Fraction Donated
I propose several robustness checks on the optimal fraction donated below. All estimates report
robust standard errors.
Optimal Fraction Donated with More Covariates. I include all the variables in the dataset as in
the fourth column of Table 2 by adding to the first-step regressions of both the demand and sup-
ply model the variables belonging to the groups “Additional Charity Dummies”, “League/Match
Dummies” and “Time Dummies.” Figure F1a shows the optimal fraction donated by intersecting
marginal revenues and marginal costs as in Section 7. On the supply side the marginal cost pa-
rameters are pi1 = 229.275,SE : 11.822;pi2 = −400.940;SE : 55.084;pi3 = 187.354,SE : 53.151, while
on the demand side α is estimated to be 0.172 and β is 0.431 when the number of bidders is 16.
The optimal fraction donated is q∗ = 0.20.
Optimal q∗ by Type of Provider. I further investigate whether the optimal fraction donated varies
consistently based on the type of provider. When available, I observe whether the object is pro-
vided by either a footballer, a coach or a charity (672 auctions). Because footballers and coaches
are closely tied to certain charities, I separate the auctions in the sample in two based on whether
the provider of the auctioned item is a private individual or not, and estimate marginal costs on
each subsample in the same way as in Section 7.
The marginal cost for the whole group including footballers and charities are negative and
upward sloping (pi1 = 248.388,SE : 28.495;pi2 = −557.406;SE : 54.894;pi3 = 349.055,SE : 56.898).
Figure F2a plots the optimal q obtained for this group. I find that q∗ = 0.32, which is very close to
that estimated in the full sample (see Figure 5a). The qualitative result does not change if I replicate
the analysis to account for the auctions provided by a charities (469 auctions, pi1 = 259.095,SE :
42.792;pi2 = −677.876;SE : 321.572;pi3 = 478.420,SE : 323.874). In this case, q∗ is 0.36.
Optimal q∗ Using IVs. As the reserve price and the fraction donated are the result of bargaining
between the provider of the item and Charitystars, in this section, I instrument the reserve price in
the demand model and the fraction donated in the supply model. On the demand side, I perform
a two-stage least square regression in place of equation 6.1; I instrument the reserve price with
the average reserve price (in logs) and the average number of bids placed in concurrent auctions
(within 5 days). The estimated α and β are 0.173 and 0.431. The F-test is large 33.269, and the
overidentification test statistic has a p-value of 0.192 (Sargan test).
On the supply side, I follow the same steps in Section 7. In the last step, instead of performing
an OLS regression of the net reserve price on a polynomial expansion of q, I instrument q and q2
with the average fraction donated (and its squared value) and the average number of bids placed
(and its squared value) across simultaneous auctions (within 5 days). The estimated marginal cost
parameters are pi1 = 273.389,SE : 44.128;pi2 = −650.978;SE : 298.535;pi3 = 422.534,SE : 296.863.
The F-test for the first endogenous regressor (q) is 30.637 and for the second endogenous regressor
(q2) is 33.063. The overidentification test has a p-value of 0.907. Despite the strong first stages,
the instruments I use would fail if the choice of the fraction donated and of the reserve price
systematically responded to common shocks across simultaneous auctions. I include the number
of listings of jerseys from the same team in the previous 3 weeks and for the same player in the
previous 2 weeks among the covariates to control for this issue. I bootsrap
Figure F3 plots both the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves (Panel a) and the expected
profits attainable at different fraction donated (Panel b). Both plots indicate that the optimal frac-
tion donated is ca. 0.30, with 95% confidence interval [0.025,0.455] (401 boostrap repetitions with
replacement – median bootstrapped q∗ = 0.335).
30
Optimal q∗ with a Different Level of Heterogeneity. In the main paper, I homogeneize all bids
and reserve prices, and sum back the value of the heterogeneity from the median auction to de-
termine both marginal revenues and marginal costs. In this section, I replicate the same analysis
but considering the heterogeneity at the 1st and 3rd quartiles. The results are in Figure F4a (the
parameters estimated in the quadratic-cost case are pi1 = 176.845,SE : 11.346;pi2 = −320.638;SE :
61.724;pi3 = 158.392,SE : 60.704, and the parameters in the cubic-cost case are pi1 = 187.055,SE :
70.489;pi2 = −445.534;SE : 823.537;pi3 = 432.089,SE : 1738.863,pi4 = −166.111;SE : 1020.906) and
Figure F4c (the parameters estimated in the quadratic-cost case are pi1 = 309.186,SE : 19.836;pi2 =
−560.587;SE : 107.916;pi3 = 276.925,SE : 106.131, and the parameters in the cubic-cost case are
pi1 = 327.037,SE : 123.24;pi2 = −778.947;SE : 1439.83;pi3 = 755.442,SE : 3040.149,pi4 = −290.42;SE :
1784.90) respectively. The optimal donation for the 1st quartile case is 18% (95% C.I. [0.025,0.330])
while for the 3rd it is 27% (95% C.I. [0.030,0.420]).
Figure F1: Optimal q∗ with more covariates
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Note: The plot displays the optimal fraction donated as the intersection of marginal costs (dotted and
dashed lines) and net benefits (solid line). The marginal costs are estimated using quadratic polynomials
(dotted line) and cubic polynomials (dashed line). Panel b. The plot displays how profits change with the
fraction doanted (q). The vertical line at 85% indicate the median donation by Charitystars. Unlike the main
text analysis, all covariates in the fourth column of Table 2 are added to the first steps of both the demand
and supply analyses. The density f (v) and the distribution F(v) are approximated using a cubic spline.
Profits are computed as net revenues minus costs as in the quadratic polynomials case. Marginal revenues
and revenues assume that the number of potential bidders is 16 in both plots.
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Figure F2: Optimal q∗ by type of provider
(a) Optimal fraction donated
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Note: The plot displays the optimal fraction donated as the intersection of marginal costs (dotted and
dashed lines) and net benefits (solid line). The marginal costs are estimated using quadratic polynomials.
Unlike the main text analysis, I limit the dataset to auctions of item provided by either charities (dashed
line) or footballers and charities (dotted line). Panel b. The plot displays how profits change with the
fraction doanted (q). The vertical line at 85% indicate the median donation by Charitystars. The density
f (v) and the distribution F(v) are approximated using a cubic spline. Profits are computed as net revenues
minus costs as in the quadratic polynomials case. Marginal revenues and revenues assume that the number
of potential bidders is 16 in both plots.
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Figure F3: Optimal q∗ using instrumental variables
(a) Optimal fraction donated
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Note: The plot displays the optimal fraction donated as the intersection of marginal costs (dotted line) and
net benefits (solid line). The marginal costs are estimated using quadratic polynomials (dotted line). Panel
b. The plot displays how profits change with the fraction doanted (q). The vertical line at 85% indicate
the median donation by Charitystars. Unlike the main text analysis, I instrument the reserve price in the
demand analysis with the average reserve price and the average number of bids placed in concurrent auc-
tions. I similarly instrument the fraction donated in the supply analysis with the average fraction donated
and the average number of bids. The density f (v) and the distribution F(v) are approximated using a cubic
spline. Profits are computed as net revenues minus costs as in the quadratic polynomials case. Marginal
revenues and revenues assume that the number of potential bidders is 16 in both plots.
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Figure F4: Optimal q∗ with a different level of heterogeneity
(a) Optimal fraction donated (25-percentile)
−600
−500
−400
−300
−200
−100
0
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Fraction donated (q)
M
R
, M
C 
(E
UR
)
M Net Revenue
MC − Quadratic
MC − Cubic
(b) Optimal profits (25-percentile)
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(c) Optimal fraction donated (75-percentile)
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(d) Optimal profits (75-percentile)
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The plot displays the optimal fraction donated as the intersection of marginal costs (dotted and dashed
lines) and net benefits (solid line). The marginal costs are estimated using quadratic polynomials. Panel
b. The plot displays how profits change with the fraction doanted (q). The vertical line at 85% indicate
the median donation by Charitystars. Unlike the main text analysis, I fit revenues and costs to represents
either the 25th- or 75th- percentile of auction heterogeneity. The density f (v) and the distribution F(v) are
approximated using a cubic spline. Profits are computed as net revenues minus costs as in the quadratic
polynomials case. Marginal revenues and revenues assume that the number of potential bidders is 16 in
both plots.
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F Monte Carlo simulations
Objectives. The Monte Carlo simulations in this section fulfil two goals: (i) to show that the
estimation routine described in Section 6 return consistent estimates of the parameters, and (ii)
to support with some empirical evidence the claim that the estimates are not consistent when the
franction donated in the two auction types is very close.
Design of the experiments. There are two auction types (A and B) such that qA = .10 and qB = .85.
Private values are generated for all bidders drawing from a uniform distribution in [0,1] in Tables
G1 and G2 and in [−1,1] in Tables G3. There are 10 bidders in each auctions. They bid according
to the bid function in (4.2). The true charitable parameters are α0 = .25 and β0 = .75.
The steps of the estimation procedure are outlined below:
1. Draw values from the distribution F(v) for each bidder in the two auctions. In total 20
values.
2. Compute the bids for each bidder in the two auctions. Save the winning bid in each auction.
3. Nonparametrically estimate the density of the winning bids (either by Triweight, or Gaus-
sian Kernel). The bandwidth is chosen using the rule-of-thumb. Trimming follows Guerre
et al. (2000) who suggested trimming observations close to 0.5× bandwidth to the bound-
ary.8
4. Given the number of bidders (n = 10) invert the distribution of the winning bids to de-
termine the distribution and density of the bids as in the second stage of the estimation
procedure.
5. Compute the distribution and density of auctions of type A for each losing bids in the inter-
val between the smallest winning bid and the largest winning bid of type A.
6. Compute the distribution and density of type B (q = .85) over 100,000 points.
7. Match the quantile of the distribution of type B with those of the distribution of type A
through (5.1).
8. Find the couple (α,β) that minimizes the objective function (6.2) starting from a random
seed. The search algorithm constraints the parameters in the unit interval.
9. Save the estimates and restart from 1.
These steps are repeated 401 times. The tables below report the mean, median, quantiles and root
mean squared errors for α and β for each combination of parameters.
Results. First, let’s asses the consistency of the estimates. Different experiments are reported
in Tables G2 and G3, showing that the estimates are close to the true parameters. In particular,
even with a small number of observations (the first line in each panel), the mean and medians are
always within 3% of the true parameters.
8For the Gaussian case the hpd f = 1.06σn−1/5 and hCDF = 1.06σn−1/3 where σ =
min{s.d.(bkw), IQR/1.349}, where bkw is the vector of winning bid for auction of type k, and
hCDF = 1.587σn−1/3. For the triweight case hpd f = hCDF = 2.978σn−1/5 (Ha¨rdle, 1991, Li et al., 2002,
Li and Racine, 2007, Lu and Perrigne, 2008).
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These tables are composed by different panels: each panel refers to a different kernel used to
estimate the distributions (and densities) of the winning bids. The Gaussian and Triweigth kernels
give similar results. Within each panel, the rows differ on the number of auctions used to estimate
the primitives. The number of bidders in each auction is always constant and equal to 10. Since
for each auction only the winning bid is used, I empirically consider the asymptotic properties of
the estimator by looking at the rate at which the root mean squared error (RMSE) decreases as
the number of auctions grows (i.e., comparing RMSE across columns).9 Comfortingly, this rate is
close to
√
n for all experiments.
To study the consistency of the estimates when there is only limited variation over q across
auctions I run similar experiments varying q instead of the nonparametric kernel. From Table G1
it is clear that α and β cannot be estimated consistently when qA ' qB as the mean and median of
the estimated parameters are about 0 and .50 instead of .25 and .75 for α and β respectively.
Table G1: Distance between qA and qB – Monte Carlo simulations
TA TB µα µβ Medα Medβ 25%α 75%α 25%β 25%β
qA = 80%, qB = 85%
500 0.0069 0.5333 0.0000 0.5328 0.0000 0.0000 0.5053 0.5589
1000 0.0094 0.5355 0.0000 0.5302 0.0000 0.0078 0.5114 0.5560
qA = 78%, qB = 85%
500 0.0158 0.5414 0.0000 0.5350 0.0000 0.0151 0.5137 0.5606
1000 0.0227 0.5477 0.0028 0.5376 0.0000 0.0348 0.5181 0.5667
qA = 50%, qB = 85%
500 0.2027 0.7086 0.1914 0.6991 0.1360 0.2520 0.6455 0.7579
1000 0.2154 0.7196 0.2071 0.7132 0.1696 0.2636 0.6763 0.7620
qA = 20%, qB = 85%
500 0.2468 0.7467 0.2383 0.7398 0.1984 0.2891 0.7033 0.7852
1000 0.2462 0.7463 0.2445 0.7444 0.2166 0.2764 0.7186 0.7730
Note: Monte Carlo simulations of the second and third step of the estimation process. Auction types are
denoted by A and B. Each panel shows the estimated parameters for different percentage donated. The
bandwidths in step 2 are computed with a Gaussian Kernel. The data is generated according to α = 25%,
β = 75% and F(v) is assumed uniform in [0,1]. Each auction has 10 bidders. 401 repetitions.
9I am analyzing the asymptotic properties of this class of estimators theoretically in another project,
which is still a work in progress.
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